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Abstract: This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamical theory of 
matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of 
the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning 
point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a 
careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the 
scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific 
tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than 
the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman 
Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the 
elaboration of Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755. 
Keywords: Kant; Repulsive force; Air; Ether; Newton; Hales; Boerhaave 
1. Introduction 
In 1786, in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant famously introduced attraction 
and repulsion as two fundamental forces in nature, within the context of his defence of a “dynamical 
natural philosophy”. The purpose of a “dynamical natural philosophy” was to explain natural 
phenomena in terms of “moving forces of attraction and repulsion originally inherent in them”,1 by 
contrast with the “mechanical natural philosophy” which “under the name of atomism or 
the corpuscular philosophy” retained its authority and influence from Democritus to Descartes. 
                                                      
1 AK 4: 532.38–533.1. Kant (1786); English translation (2004), p. 72. In this context, Kant uses the terms 
Anziehung und Zurückstoßung to indicate, respectively, attractive and repulsive force as forces inherent in 
matter, and responsible for matter’s different specific densities. Both forces act among parts of matter. Indeed, at 
the outset of the chapter on Dynamics (Explication 2), Kant says that there are only these two forces (Anziehung 
und Zurückstoßung) with which one point of matter can impress motion on another (AK 4: 498.17–33). A few 
lines down, in Proposition 2 [AK 4: 499.6–18, 500.2] and throughout the chapter, Kant uses 
Zurückstoßungskraft interchangeably with repulsive Kraft, and he explicitly identifies it with an expansive force 
(Ausdehnungskraft or expansive Kraft), which is nothing but the elasticity of matter (Elasticität). Apropos of 
attraction, Edwards (2000), p. 142, identifies in the chapter on Dynamics (but also in Universal Natural History) 
two possible views of it, which he calls a ‘‘collective view’’, identifiable with Newtonian gravitation 
(Gravitation) as a long-range force acting at a distance on planetary bodies, and a ‘‘distributive view’’, 
identifiable with the cohesion of solid bodies as a short-range force (Anziehung) acting by contact between 
juxtaposed parts of matter. One may wonder whether a similar distinction can be found in the same period as far 
as repulsive force is concerned (for example, the repulsive force at work between the north and south poles of 
two magnets when brought together seems to defy the characterization of Zurückstoßungskraft as a short-range 
contact force—I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out). It suffices here to note that—as we will see 
below—the terminology Anziehung und Zurückstoßung as used in the aforementioned passage from the 1786 
chapter on Dynamics is exactly the same terminology Kant used thirty years earlier in the 1755 Universal 
Natural History, where he first presented his dynamical theory of matter. 
  
Repulsive force was introduced to explain how matter can fill a determinate region of space: it was 
regarded as an expansive force “also called elasticity” and “all matter is therefore originally 
elastic”.2 To illustrate repulsive force as an original elastic force that comes in degrees in different 
matters, Kant repeatedly resorted to the example of air, or “air matters”,3 sometimes associated with 
heat4 intended either as “oscillation of elastic matter”5 or (in the General Remark to Dynamics) as the 
“matter of heat … whose own elasticity is perhaps original”.6 A few lines below in the same passage, 
Kant called the matter of heat “caloric”7 [Wärmestoff] and presented it as an example of chemical 
penetration, insofar as it penetrates the empty interstices of bodies. Kant gave also other examples of 
chemical penetration, namely the dissolution of matter as when acids dissolve metallic bodies or the 
“dissolving forces” at work in “vegetable or animal operations”.8 There follows Kant’s defence of the 
ether as a matter filling all space, but very subtle compared to the matter of ordinary bodies: “In the 
aether, the repulsive force must be thought as incomparably larger in proportion to its inherent 
attractive force than in any other matters known to us”.9 
Why does Kant say that repulsive force, as an expansive elastic force, comes in different 
degrees in different matters, among which nonetheless the same attractive force operates?10 Why does 
he refer to the expansive force of air, heat, and ether to illustrate the different degrees of repulsive 
force at work in nature? What do air, heat, and ether have in common that justifies their association 
with repulsive force? In this paper, I take a first step towards answering these open questions. 
Thirty years earlier, in the 1756 Physical Monadology, Kant had already introduced some 
seminal ideas for his dynamical theory of matter. Not only did he introduce the two fundamental 
forces of attraction and repulsion; but he also expressly made repulsive force the cause of the 
impenetrability of bodies, and identified it with an elastic force acting by direct contact, and coming in 
                                                      
2 AK 4: 500.2–6. 
3 AK 4: 500.20–26. English translation, p. 37: ‘‘When, in the barrel of an air pump filled with air, the piston is 
driven closer and closer to the bottom, the air-matter [Luftmaterie] is compressed. If this compression could now 
be driven so far that the piston completely touched the bottom. . .then the air-matter would be penetrated’’. And 
again, AK 4: 505.10–19, English translation p. 42: ‘‘the smallest parts of the air repel one another in inverse 
ratio to their distances from one another, because the elasticity of these parts stands in inverse ratio to the spaces 
in which they are compressed. . .a greater or smaller space is to be represented as completely filled by one and 
the same quantity of matter, that is, one and the same quantum of repulsive force’’. 
4 AK: 4: 522.30–38, English translation p. 61: ‘‘But we may also view the expansive force of air not as the 
action of originally repelling forces, but as resting rather on heat, which compels the proper parts of air . . . to 
flee one another, not merely as a matter penetrating it, but rather, to all appearances, through its vibrations’’. 
And again AK 4:524.02– 06, English translation p. 62: ‘‘attraction rests on the aggregate of matter in a given 
space, whereas its expansive force, by contrast, rests on the degree of filling of this space, which can be very 
different specifically (as the same quantity of air, say, in the same volume, manifests more or less elasticity in 
accordance with its greater or lesser heating)’’. 
5 AK 4:522.37. Eng. trans. p. 61. 
6 AK 4:530.2–3. Eng. trans. p. 69. 
7 AK 4:532.4. 
8 AK 4:531.39. Eng. trans. p. 71. 
9 AK 4: 534.9–11. English translation, p. 73. 
10 AK 4:533.38–40, 534.1–2. English translation, p. 73: ‘‘repulsive force, which has a degree that can be 
different in different matters; and, since in itself it has nothing in common with the attractive force, which 
depends on the quantity of matter, it may be originally different in degree in different matters whose attractive 
force is the same’’. 
  
different degrees in different things (hence the different elasticities of bodies).11 And among elastic 
bodies, Kant included the “aether, that is to say, the matter of fire”.12 
I believe that some pre-Critical aspects of Kant’s dynamical theory of matter were taken up in 
more complex ways in the Critical period, so I do not want to make any swift claim suggesting that we 
should read the Metaphysical Foundations through the lenses of the pre-Critical writings of 1755–6. 
However, I do think that some baffling aspects of Kant’s Critical treatment of repulsive force have 
their seeds in the pre-Critical theory of matter of 1755. It is the aim of this paper to shed light on them 
by reconstructing some of the scientific sources behind Kant’s identification of repulsive force with an 
expansive, elastic force acting by contact. 
I am going to concentrate on the very origins of Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in Universal 
Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755a), and De igne (1755b—henceforth referred to 
as On Fire). I identify an important, and so far overlooked, scientific tradition behind it, namely 
British and Dutch natural philosophy of the eighteenth century, which—with a firm footing in the 
Queries of Newton’s Opticks (first Latin edition 1706; second English edition 1717)—flourished in 
England with Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks (1727) and in Leiden with Herman 
Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae (1732). The relevance of this alternative experimental tradition can be 
found not only in Kant’s analysis of repulsive force in the explanation of a variety of chemical and 
thermal phenomena in On Fire, but also in some key aspects of his cosmogony (1755a) as well as in 
his early elaboration of causality in New Elucidation (1755c), as I shall mention in Section 3.2. 
While most of the secondary literature on this topic has in recent times concentrated on Kant’s 
conversion and debt to Newton’s Principia, especially as far as his 1786 defence of Newton’s 
universal gravitation is concerned,13 some scholars have drawn attention to the relevance of 
corpuscular and chemical theories of matter in the seventeenth and eighteenth century natural 
philosophy for Kant’s dynamical theory of matter.14 The aim of this paper is to contribute to the 
existing literature by both (i) complementing the received view of Kant’s debt to the Principia, and 
(ii) by further exploring the legacy of both dynamical corpuscularism and materialism of the 
seventeenth century for Kant’s early theory of matter. 
The paper is divided in five sections. In Section 2, I focus on some salient aspects of 
Kant’s Universal Natural History that in my view betray his allegiance to the more speculative 
                                                      
11 AK 1: 483.11, 486.36–38. Kant explained in Proposition XII how the different densities of bodies in the 
nature (‘‘for example, aether, air, water, and gold’’) should be explained by assuming ‘‘a specific difference 
between the simplest elements’’ that compose bodies (AK 1: 486.11–13). In the following Proposition XIII he 
then ascribed to individual simple elements an innate, perfectly elastic force ‘‘which is different in different 
things’’ and through which the elements would occupy the space of their presence (AK 1: 486.36–38, 487.1–2). 
12 AK 1: 487.18. Kant (1756), English translation (1992), p. 66. As we shall see below, the introduction of 
attraction and repulsion, and the identification of the ether as the repository of repulsive force and as the matter 
of fire pre-dates Physical Monadology, appearing for the first time in 1755 in De igne. 
13 See especially Friedman (1992a), (1992b), (2004) translation of Kant (1786), and Friedman (2006). For a 
detailed reconstruction of Kant’s conversion to Newton in the pre-Critical writings after 1747, see Schönfeld 
(2000). For Kant’s early dynamics (with a particular focus on Kant’s first 1747 work True estimation of living 
forces and on Kant’s 1755 cosmogony), see also Schönfeld (2006a, 2006b), respectively. 
14 See Adickes (1924), Carrier (1990, 2001); Edwards (2000), chapter 6. Edwards, in particular, has argued that 
the assumption of physical ether, as an imponderable elastic matter, is pivotal to Kant’s dynamical theory of 
matter, and more in general to the evolution of Kant’s thought from the pre-Critical writings of 1755 through the 
Critical period, up to the Opus postumum. It is not the aim of this paper to draw any overarching conclusion 
about the role of Kant’s dynamical theory of matter for his overall philosophical project. My more modest aim is 
to clarify what I take to be some relevant scientific sources for understanding better Kant’s treatment of 
repulsive force. 
  
Newton of the Opticks. To substantiate these claims, in Section 3, I give a rather detailed survey of 
some aspects of speculative Newtonianism (§ 3.1), as these aspects were further developed by Stephen 
Hales (to whom § 3.2 is dedicated) and by Herman Boerhaave (§ 3.3). My interpretive line is that 
Newton’s ambiguity about the ether engendered two traditions, a mechanical one and a materialistic 
one—to borrow Schofield’s (1970) terminology—which can be respectively found in Hales’ 
experiments on elastic airs, and Boerhaave’s theory of fire; and that these two traditions got 
intertwined in Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in 1755. 
More precisely, (a.) the Newton of pre-Principia and Opticks offered air first, and ether then as 
the repository of repulsive force; (b.) Stephen Hales’ ‘chymio-statical experiments’ on airs, building 
on Newton, provided the main source of inspiration for Kant’s repulsive force manifesting itself in the 
dissolution of matter in vapours as per Universal Natural History; (c.) the chemical role of Hales’ 
elastic air influenced in turn Herman Boerhaave’s theory of fire as a material substance trapped in all 
bodies and released in combustions. This, in turn, provided the main source of inspiration for 
Kant’s On Fire (Section 4), whereby Kant operated a synthesis between Newton’s ether as the matter 
of light and Boerhaave’s matter of fire (in surprising continuity with the much later role of the ether of 
the Opus postumum as Wärmestoff).15 In Section 5, I make some concluding remarks about the nature 
of Kant’s debt to Newtonianism. 
2. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens 
Universal Natural History is certainly one of the most important Kantian texts of the pre-
Critical period. In it, Kant advanced the hypothesis of the origin of the universe from a nebula, in 
which attractive and repulsive forces were at work. Kantian scholars have been unanimous in reading 
this 1755 text as the manifesto of Kant’s conversion to Newton, after the 1747 work True estimation 
of living forces dominated, as it were, by the ongoing debate between Leibnizians and Cartesians.16 
 The purpose of my paper is to clarify some aspects of Kant’s much celebrated conversion to Newton. 
Kant’s dynamical theory of matter has been for long time associated with Newton’s Principia. The 
association is justified and supported by the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science (abbreviated here as MAN), where attraction is identified as a force acting at a distance 
through empty space.17 But Kant’s treatment of repulsive force raises some issues that in my view 
betray a more complex story than unqualified allegiance to the Principia. If we look at the history of 
Kant’s own ideas, and how thirty years earlier he came to elaborate his embryonic dynamical theory 
of matter in Universal Natural History and On Fire, we can see some of the seeds of his mature 
dynamics and get a more nuanced picture of his conversion to Newtonianism. I am going to argue in 
                                                      
15 In the Opus postumum, in the ix fascicle ‘‘Towards an elementary system of the moving forces of matter’’, 
Kant introduced the ether as an ‘‘originally elastic matter’’ acting both as the matter of light and the matter of 
heat or ‘‘caloric (. . .) regardless of the fact that, in the latter condition, it is neither a fluid nor repulsive, but only 
makes fluid and expand their matter’’ AK 22: 214.13–22. Kant (1936, 1938); English translation (1993), p. 33. 
The link between ether and repulsive force becomes explicit in a note on the left margin of sheet I of ix fascicle, 
where Kant says: ‘‘Repulsion can act as a superficial force, or as a penetrative force (but not one acting at a 
distance, like gravitation). In the latter case, the repulsion of all internal material parts of all bodies is heat. One 
could call the ether empyreal air (. . .) as an expansive matter whose penetration contains the ground of all the 
forms of air’’ AK 22: 214.23–27, 215.2. English translation, p. 33. Note that here too Kant uses the term 
Zurückstoßung to denote repulsive force as a superficial force (Flächenkraft) or a penetrative one 
(durchdringende Kraft), in either case as a force acting by direct contact and not at a distance by contrast with 
Newton’s universal gravitation, denoted here by the term Gravitation (not Anziehung). 
16 On the relevance of Universal Natural History for Kant’s conversion to Newton, see for example Schönfeld 
(2000), pp. 89–95; Friedman’s Introduction to the (2004) translation of Kant (1786), and Introduction to 
(1992a). 
17 AK 4: 512.18–19. 
  
this paper that it was Newton’s speculative experimentalism that provided the source of inspiration for 
Kant’s treatment of repulsive force in the early dynamical theory of matter. And this would clarify 
some of the prima facie puzzling aspects of it (for example, why is it a contact force, by contrast with 
attraction? Why is it identified with an elastic, expansive force coming in different degrees in different 
materials?). 
I do not mean to deny the importance of the Principia for Kant’s adoption of attraction as a 
universal driving power of nature. But I think that while much attention has been paid to this 
particular aspect of Kant’s philosophy of nature, not enough attention has been paid so far to Kant’s 
more puzzling characterization of repulsive force, which—if my interpretive line here below is 
correct—betrays his allegiance to the Newton of the Queries of Opticks more than to the Principia. 
Moreover, and incidentally, I think that Kant’s analysis in Universal Natural History of the 
mechanism responsible for the formation of celestial bodies via the interaction of attraction and 
repulsion betrays once more Kant’s idiosyncratic take on Newton. Kant did not lay out an explicit set 
of mechanical laws in Universal Natural History and the dynamical mechanism he envisaged to 
explain how planets formed and began to spin in terms of attraction and repulsion cannot, of course, 
be found in Newton’s Principia, since Newton did not provide a cosmogony. Yet Kant’s subtitle reads 
“An essay on the constitution and mechanical origin of the whole universe treated according to 
Newton’s principles”. Scholars have read this as a sign of Kant’s endorsement of Newton’s Principia, 
but I contend that Kant’s cosmogony is in fact at odds with Newtonian principles in some relevant 
aspects.18  The mechanism involving attraction and repulsion that Kant envisaged in Universal 
Natural History shows signs of divergence from Newton’s Principia (§ 2.1).19  Moreover, Kant’s 
repulsive force is borrowed from Newton’s theory of matter as exposed in some pre-Principia works 
and in the Opticks, rather than from Newton’s mechanics of the Principia (as I am going to show in 
§ 2.2). Thus, investigating Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755 can help us get a more 
nuanced picture of his much celebrated conversion to Newton. 
2.1. In what respects Universal Natural History shows signs of divergence from Newton’s Principia 
Kant’s cosmogony is based on the idea of subtle particles of matter being originally diffused 
across celestial space. Kant did not expressly speak of ether in Universal Natural History; instead in 
continuity with both the 1747 essay True estimation of living forces, and the 1754 essay on the Earth’s 
axial rotation, he talked of a “fine stuff” diffused in celestial space.20 Already in the 1747 essay, Kant 
had introduced the assumption of an “infinitely subtle space” in the context of a discussion of 
Leibniz’s vis viva to explain how the motion of bodies through space may result in different 
actions/effects (Wirkungen) on the basis of their interaction with the “little molecules of space”.21  He 
seemed to believe that for motion of freely moving bodies to obey Leibniz’s law of squared velocity, 
it was necessary to assume that space was not empty but filled with “an infinitely rarified matter, 
                                                      
18 I thank Eric Watkins, Robby Gustin, and an anonymous referee for comments that helped me refine this point. 
19 One may retort that since the Principia does not provide a cosmogony, it is not surprising after all that Kant’s 
Universal Natural History is at odds with it. Of course, it was not the aim of the Principia to explain how planets 
formed or began to spin. The issue though remains as to why Kant’s subtitle reads ‘‘An essay on the constitution 
and mechanical origin of the whole universe treated according to Newton’s principles’’. What are the 
‘‘Newton’s principles’’ Kant referred to here, since there is no mention of either Newton’s three laws or the law 
of universal gravitation? Could they be tracked down in the Principia? The following sub-section (2.1) should be 
read with an eye towards answering these questions. 
20 ‘‘feinen Grundstoffe’’ AK 1: 268.20. Kant (1755a), English translation (1969), p. 69. 
21 ‘‘unendlich subtilen Raume’’ and ‘‘kleine Moleculas des Raumes’’ AK 1: 29.8, 29.24. Kant (1747), English 
translation (in press), p. 39. I thank Eric Watkins to allow me access to a pre-print version of the English 
translation. 
  
which has accordingly infinitely little resistance”.22  The idea of a spatial plenum in this context came 
indeed from Leibniz’s fluid vortex theory offering little resistance to the motion of bodies, and Kant 
seemed to take it as part and parcel of Leibniz’s theory.23 
While the 1747 essay was still very much rooted in the tradition of Leibniz’s metaphysical 
dynamics, the first signs of Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics appeared in the 1754 essay on 
the Earth’s axial rotation, whereby Kant seemed to take the distance from Leibniz’s fluid vortex 
theory and replaced it with the idea of a more subtle and “infinitely less resisting” matter filling 
celestial space, which would allow “a free unhindered motion to the light vapour of comets”, as 
Newton had shown.24  Here Kant ascribed directly to Newton the hypothesis of a very subtle and 
infinitely less resisting matter filling the cosmic space, the very same type of matter that he assumed 
to fill the cosmos a year later, in Universal Natural History. But what was this subtle matter offering 
infinitely weak resistance to the motion of comets and celestial bodies? As we shall see in Section 3, 
there was a natural candidate for this role within Newton’s natural philosophy: namely, the ether, 
which although did not appear in the first edition of Newton’s Principia (1687), it featured nonetheless 
in the second edition (1713), thanks to the resonance that the first Latin (1706) edition of the Opticks 
had had in the meantime, with a new set of Queries where the ether featured.25 So, when in 1755 Kant 
referred to a feinen Grundstoffe diffused in the primordial cosmic space, he was building upon an 
                                                      
22 ‘‘den Raum. . .mit Materie, aber mit unendlich dünner, folglich unendlich wenig widerstehender Materie 
erfüllt ’’ AK 1: 115.7–9. English translation (in press), p. 145. In the case of two bodies with the same mass and 
traversing the same space (with different velocities), the one with greater velocity would have a greater effect on 
the account of the number of particles in space, to which it would have imparted a greater velocity, according to 
Kant’s argument. 
23 See Leibniz’s (1689) ‘‘Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis’’, written after seeing the review of Newton’s 
Principia in Acta eruditorum. Leibniz formulated a theory of gravity that could provide a mechanical 
explanation for it via the fluid vortex. Like Huygens in Horologium Oscillatorium (1673), Leibniz too explained 
orbital motions as the result of two opposite forces: gravity and what Huygens called the ‘centrifugal force’, i.e. 
the force to recede from the centre. Huygens had explained gravity as a force opposite to the centrifugal one, 
which in turns originated from a subtle fluid surrounding the body. As Bertoloni Meli (1993), chapter 2, has 
persuasively argued, after the appearance of Newton’s Principia, Huygens re-interpreted the subtle fluid as an 
ether consisting of very light particles—so light that they could not impede the motion of planets and comets 
through the ether—and whose varying density could explain the varying velocities of rotation of planets. 
Huygens’ idea that gravity could be explained as a force opposite to the centrifugal one inspired Leibniz, who 
had independently been studying the link between gravity and what he called ‘elasticity’ from the early 1670s, 
following up the tradition of Robert Boyle as well as mechanical studies on elastic impact by Huygens himself 
and Mariotte. This latter tradition of studies on elastic impact bore direct links with Leibniz’s studies on vis viva, 
which Kant profusely discussed in ch. 2 of his 1747 True estimation. The ability of an elastic body to squeeze 
and return back to its original shape was regarded as the expression of the body conserving his force in the 
Specimen dynamicum (1695) and other Leibnizian writings of the period. In his mature years, Leibniz explained 
elasticity in mechanical terms, i.e. in terms of subtle fluids, and he took it to be a fundamental property of matter 
in the universe, or better, as Bertoloni Meli calls it, a ‘‘structural principle of matter’’. 
24 ‘‘der Himmelsraum. . .mit unendlich wenig widerstehender Materie erfüllt sei’’ AK 1: 186.30–33. Kant 
(1754), English translation (1968), p. 159. 
25 Westfall (1971) ventures an explanation for the revival of the ether in the second edition of the Principia and, 
most importantly, in the Opticks: ‘‘[Newton] introduced the aether to provide a mechanical explanation of forces 
which had appeared so occult to a generation raised on the mechanical philosophy’’ p. 395. But by contrast with 
Descartes’ dense material ether or Leibniz’s fluid one, Newton’s ether was supposed to be very subtle and 
offering almost no resistance to the motion of celestial bodies. Aiton (1972), chapter 6, refers to two manuscripts 
of Newton around 1714, following the second edition of Principia (‘Ex epistola cujusdam ad amicum’ and 
‘Notae in Acta eruditorum an.89 p. 84’) where Newton discussed the specific problem of comets against 
Leibniz’s fluid vortex theory, while Bertoloni Meli (1993), p. 199, quotes a letter of Newton to Leibniz on 17 
March 1693, where Newton defended empty space and challenged Leibniz to explain how planets and comets 
may travel unhindered through the etherial fluid. 
  
ongoing controversy between Leibniz’s fluid vortex theory and Newton’s infinitely weakly resisting 
ether. 
Yet Kant’s somewhat nuanced approach to “Newtonian principles” becomes evident if we 
consider the mechanism envisaged for the formation of celestial bodies out of the subtle matter 
diffused through space. Despite attraction lumping the primordial fine matter to form planets and 
stars, attraction per se was not sufficient to explain the origin of heavenly bodies. It was the 
combination of Newtonian attraction and of what Kant called “the mechanical consequences of the 
general laws of resistance”26  that explained the formation of heavenly bodies out of whirling 
primordial matter. The other force responsible for the formation of heavenly bodies was indeed the 
repulsive force,27 whose main role—according to Kant—was to counterbalance the attractive force, 
and make the fine matter whirl in vortices. 
While attraction was deemed responsible for the formation of increasingly bigger lumps of 
matter, which eventually resulted in planets and stars, repulsion was entrusted with the crucial role of 
explaining how the particles of matter—instead of collapsing into one big lump—began to whirl in 
vortices of different densities that eventually resulted in the different planets and stars that we observe. 
Kant ascribed to the inter-particulate repulsive force the role of turning sideways the particles of 
primordial matter from their rectilinear motions (due to attraction): “Their perpendicular fall thereby 
issues in circular movements, which encompass the centre towards which they were falling”.28 And 
once the central body had grown enough to attract an increasing number of particles, under the effect 
of repulsion among them, lateral movements took place producing “whirls or vortices of particles, 
each of which by itself describes a curved line by the composition of the attracting force and the force 
of revolution that has been bent sideways”.29 Thus, the free circular movements of primordial particles 
were the products of the two fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion, as “essential forces”30 of 
matter, whose counterbalance ensued the vortex mechanism, key to Kant’s cosmogony. 
This mechanical explanation of the formation of particle vortices—due to inter-particulate 
repulsion—was not to be found in the Greek atomists, from Epicurus to Democritus, with their 
“absurd fancies regarding the cause and consequences of [particles’ deviation from straight 
line]”.31 Nor was to be found in Descartes’ vortex theory either. But, interestingly enough, it was not 
to be found in Newton’s Principia either. While Newton had introduced attraction and repulsion 
already in the first edition of Principia, he did not envisage for them the type of counterbalance and 
role that Kant bestowed on them for his cosmogony.32 For Newton, the centrifugal force was a force 
equal and opposite the centripetal force, as per Newton’s III law, without any further grounding into 
attraction and repulsion. For Kant, on the other hand, centripetal and centrifugal forces at work in 
planetary motions had to be given a dynamical grounding in terms of attractive and repulsive forces 
acting among the particles of the primordial matter. Moreover, Kant introduced Newtonian attraction 
as a force inherent in the primordial matter, or as an “essential force” of matter, in contrast with 
Newton, who resisted the accusation of his foes (from Leibniz to Berkeley) that attraction was an 
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“essential force” of matter, and hence possibly an occult quality.33 In this way, Kant’s cosmogony 
could dispense with what he took to be Newton’s ‘work-day God’. In Kant’s hands, Newtonian 
attraction became immanent the fine matterand via a mechanical mode, it became one of the causal 
agents responsible for the constitution of the universe. 
Kant’s nuanced attitude towards Newton’s mechanical laws becomes evident in the Second 
Part, First Chapter. Kant took the lead from Maupertuis’ discussion of nebulous stars,34  to argue that 
they were not single massive stars, whose elliptical form would be caused by their axial rotation, but 
instead clusters of very distant stars, whose elliptical configuration was analogous to the plane of the 
Milky Way. Kant then speculated about the cause of the ‘systematic constitution’ of the starry heaven, 
from our solar system to the Milky Way and the nebulous stars farther away. 
Kant introduced two possible views about the origin of the universe. The first one, taking into 
account all planetary motions, postulated “a cause, whatever it may be, [that] has exercised an 
influence throughout the whole extent of the system (…) a material cause by which they have been put 
into motion”. The second view, on the other hand, held that the space where planets move was 
“entirely empty and bereft of all matter that could cause a community of influence on these heavenly 
bodies (…). Newton moved by this reason could allow no material cause (…). He asserted that the 
immediate hand of God had instituted this arrangement without the intervention of forces of nature”.35 
Kant’s presentation of Newton’s view is of course questionable,36 and betrays the mixed 
reception of Newton among the Continental (French and German) intellectuals Kant was acquainted 
with.37  It is not my aim here to investigate whether this is an accurate picture of Newton, but rather 
how Kant articulated his own view by comparing it with what he took to be Newton’s view. 
Kant then tried to reconcile these two views—the first of which is broadly mechanical in 
believing in amaterial cause (for example, a fluid vortex) imparting motion to planets by immediate 
contact as opposed to action at a distance—by introducing his own view: 
In the present constitution of space (…) there exists no material cause which could 
impress or direct their movements. The space is completely empty, or, at least, as good as 
empty; it must therefore have formerly been in another condition, and filled with enough 
of potential matter capable of transmitting motion to all the heavenly bodies found in 
it (…). And after attraction has cleaned up the said spaces and gathered all the scattered 
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matter into particular masses, the planets must have continued their revolutions freely and 
unaltered in a non-resistant space, with the motion once impressed upon them.38 
Kant reconciled the two views by, on the one side, endorsing what he took to be Newton’s orthodox 
view about celestial space as empty and bereft of matter, and, on the other side, by availing himself of 
the mechanical idea of a material cause responsible for imparting the original motions to planets. So, 
not only did the Principia offer no cosmogony or explanation of how planets formed and began to 
spin. But, from Kant’s viewpoint, such an explanation was not even available within the resources of 
the Principia. Kant’s explanation of the origin of the universe is ultimately mechanical but not 
necessarily along the lines of Newton’s mechanics in the Principia: to Kant’s eyes—and to the eyes of 
many of his generation—Newton did not seem able to explain what set planets in motion at the very 
origin of the universe, apart from resorting to God’s intervention. 
Kant presented his own reconciliation of the two views as more than just a hypothesis, and yet 
he called it a “hypothesis”.39  There could be two different explanations for it. The first is religious. 
Kant wanted to avoid any clash with religious authorities, and the nebular hypothesis clashed with the 
Christian idea of creation ex nihilo. No wonder, Kant was at pain already in the Preface to clarify how 
his view was compatible with religious beliefs.40 But, I want to suggest also a second explanation for 
presenting his view as a hypothesis: namely, the speculative character of Kant’s analysis of a subtle 
matter diffused in cosmic space. By calling his view a “hypothesis”, Kant might have signalled to his 
readers his allegiance to a well-respected tradition, in which speculative hypotheses were allowed as 
investigative tools in scientific inquiry (despite Newton’s orthodox hypothesis non fingo). In other 
words, it is the speculative method of Newton’s Opticks—exemplarily displayed in the Queries—that 
fits nicely with the dynamical corpuscolarism of Kant’s cosmogony. But if Kant’s appeal to a fine 
matter originally diffused in space and to an original material cause/vortex mechanism underpinning 
the counterbalance of attractive and repulsive forces were not already sufficient signs of Kant’s 
distance from Newton’s orthodoxy, there is a third aspect of his cosmogony that in my view betrays 
his being closer to the Opticks. 
Kant presented the elements of primordial matter as having different specific densities, such 
that those with “greater specific density and force of attraction (…) would therefore be more scattered 
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added. In surprising continuity with Universal Natural History, Kant tried once more to reconcile the Newtonian 
orthodox view about cosmic space being empty, with the dynamical view of a cosmic space originally filled 
with very weakly resisting matter as a material cause of planets’ motion and offering negligible resistance to it. 
39 AK 1: 263.3–12. Ibid., p. 61. 
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certain time from rude matter, by the sole continuation of a motion once impressed’’. AK 1: 228.21–35. Ibid., p. 
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than the lighter kinds when the material of the world was equally diffused in space”.41  This analysis is 
germane to the dynamical corpuscularism defended by Newton in the Opticks, Book II, Part III, 
Proposition X, where Newton assumed that the corpuscles had different specific densities to explain 
the different refractive indexes of natural bodies. According to Newton, all material bodies are porous; 
they consist of corpuscles with irregular shapes and different densities, and, with the ether uniformly 
distributed both in between them and outside them. For bodies with similar specific densities, Newton 
explained their different refractive powers on the basis of their allegedly different proportions of 
sulphureous oily particles, which—he thought—were present in all bodies. So, while Kant was 
drawing on Newton’s dynamical corpuscularism for the idea of particles with different densities, he 
also took the distance from what he perceived as the “inadequacy of Newton’s explanation”42 
concerning the different densities of planets. 
According to Kant, “The scattered elements of a denser kind, by means of their attraction, 
gather from a sphere around them all the matter of less specific gravity”.43 In this way, the scattered 
elements of denser kind became the nucleation sites for the formation of planetary bodies. At the same 
time, the elements of lighter kinds, which had not been captured by the attraction of the denser 
elements, tended to stay towards the centre of the system. This would explain, according to Kant, why 
for example the matter of the Sun is “four times lighter than that of the Earth”, and why the Moon is in 
turn “twice denser than the Earth”.44 Kant defended this “mechanical theory” against what he called 
the “inadequacy” of Newton’s explanation of the various densities of planets as due to the “fitness of 
the Divine choice and the motives of the Divine purpose”.45 
According to Newton, planets closer to the centre of the solar system would be denser because 
they would need to endure the Sun’s heat, and if they had lighter density, they would ignite like 
comets. But, according to Kant, Newton made the mistake of confusing the density of the surface of 
each planet with the density of its interior, which cannot be affected by the Sun’s heat. A more 
satisfactory explanation of why the planets have different densities did not require God’s intervention 
or any divine choice then, but a purely mechanical explanation, in Kant’s eyes. Hence, Kant took the 
distance not only from Newton’s theological stance but also from Newton’s mechanics of 
the Principia in some relevant aspects: or better, he took the distance from the former insofar as it was 
part and parcel of the latter. On the other hand, there are important aspects of the dynamical 
corpuscularism at work in Kant’s cosmogony that betray his allegiance to a different Newton, namely 
to the Newton of the Opticks, as I show in the rest of this paper. 
2.2. Why does Kant say that repulsive force is not ‘demonstrated by the science of Newton’? 
The unequivocal sign that the Principia were not necessarily the main source of inspiration 
for Universal Natural History can be found in the Preface: 
I have applied no other forces than those of attraction and repulsion to the evolution of the great 
order of nature: two forces which are both equally certain, equally simple (…). They are both 
borrowed from the Natural Philosophy of Newton. The first is a law of nature, which is now 
established beyond doubt. The second, which is perhaps not demonstrated by the science of 
Newton with so much distinctness as the first, is accepted here only in that understanding of it 
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which no one questions, namely, in connection with the finest dissolution of matter, as for 
instance in vapour.46 
Mark the last sentence of this important passage. Kant here claimed that both attraction and repulsion 
were borrowed from Newton’s natural philosophy. However, by contrast with attraction, repulsion 
was not demonstrated by the science of Newton, but it was accepted mainly on the basis of evidence 
such as the dissolution of matter in vapours. He stressed the same point in the First Chapter: “This 
force of repulsion is manifested in the elasticity of vapours, the effluences of strong smelling bodies, 
and the diffusion of all spirituous matter”.47  What is the main source for Kant’s repulsive force? Why 
did Kant say that Newton could not demonstrate repulsive force, and that the best evidence for it came 
from “spirituous matter”? 
This could be a simple methodological remark. While Newton’s analysis—the method of 
making experiments and observations and drawing conclusions by induction, as displayed in 
the Opticks—identified two fundamental forces in nature (attraction and repulsion); Newton’s 
synthesis—the opposite method of starting from causes as established principles and deducing 
phenomena from them—as paradigmatically displayed in the Principia—could not mathematically 
derive from the two forces of attraction and repulsion all thermal, optical and other types of 
phenomena. But before I go on to substantiate this interpretive line, let us proceed with order and take 
first a look at some key passages of Universal Natural History, where Kant appealed to the repulsive 
force for the explanation of some phenomena. 
Repulsive force is not only central to Kant’s analysis of nebular vortices in the constitution of 
planets. It is also a key element for his analysis of: (i) comets; (ii) Saturn’s ring; and (iii) solar heat. 
This is a particularly interesting area to explore the nature of Kant’s debt to the Newtonian tradition. 
Cometography was a popular topic at the time. Not only did Newton resort to the great eccentricities 
of comets to rebut Leibniz’s fluid vortex theory; but, after him, Newtonians such as de Maupertuis in 
the 1732 Discours expressly used comets to explain the origin of Saturn’s satellites and ring.48 So, 
when in the Second Part, Third Chapter of Universal Natural History, Kant addressed the eccentricity 
of planetary orbits and the origin of comets, he was not only engaging with a well-established 
Newtonian literature, but also trying to find his own feet in it. 
Kant seemed to be at pain to explain how the “free circulatory movements of the primitive 
matter” required a modification to account for the eccentricities of planetary orbits. Perhaps he felt 
that Newton’s argument from comets applied to Leibniz’s fluid vortex as much as it might have 
applied to his own dynamical theory of matter (with the counterbalance between attraction and 
repulsion engendering the circular motions of primordial matter). And since these circular motions in 
turn engendered planets’ axial rotations as well as their rotations around the Sun, in the “systematic 
constitution” of the universe, Kant felt the need to address Newton’s argument from comets. 
To explain the eccentricities of both planetary orbits and comets, he had to “limit the hypothesis 
of the exact circular movement of the particles of primitive matter” so as to “allow a wider divergence 
from it, the more distantly these elementary particles have floated away from the Sun. (…) and the 
resistance of the nearer portions of this primitive matter (…) diminishes in the proportions in which 
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these nearer particles move away under it”.49 At large distances from the centre of the solar system, 
attractive and repulsive force were feeble, as the particles were rarer and lighter; and this would 
explain the eccentricities of both planetary orbits (with the exception of Mars and Mercury which are 
closer to the Sun) and comets, which formed out of the lightest particles in the most remote regions of 
space. 
It is because of their constitution out of the lightest particles in the most remote regions of the 
solar system that comets present the “vapour heads and tails by which they are distinguished from 
other heavenly bodies. The dispersion of the matter of comets into vapour cannot be attributed mainly 
to the action of the heat of the Sun: for some comets scarcely reach as near the Sun as the distance of 
the Earth’s orbit”.50 
This explanation proved in turn expedient to clarify in the following Fifth Chapter the origin of 
Saturn’s ring. Like Maupertuis, Kant too defended the “comet-like nature” of Saturn’s ring.51  But, 
while for Maupertuis, Saturn’s ring was a comet tail that—by falling into the sphere of attraction of 
Saturn—was captured by it; for Kant, Saturn’s ring originated from the very same “comet-like” 
vaporous state or “cometic atmosphere” consisting of the lightest and weakly resisting particles, which 
arose from the planet surface, and continued to float around it in virtue of the momentum impressed 
by Saturn’s axial rotation. To support his view, Kant discussed Cassini’s observations of the diurnal 
rotation of Saturn and the ensuing ratio of gravitational and centrifugal force determining its 
spheroidal shape, and concluded against Newton’s hypothesis of uniform density that the planet had a 
varying density, increasing towards the centre and with the lightest particles arising from its surface. 
The varying degrees of density were in turn used by Kant to explain the solar heat in the 
Addition to the Seventh Chapter. In continuity with his previous analysis, Kant claimed that the Sun 
was a mixture of light and heavy particles, with a higher percentage of light particles (which were 
always more abundant in the centre of the solar system). This explained, according to Kant, why the 
Sun had a density four times lighter than the Earth, and why the Sun was a “flaming body and not a 
mass of molten and glowing matter heated up to the highest degree”.52 Kant claimed that lighter, 
volatile particles were the “most active in maintaining fire”,53 and their higher percentage in the 
central body of the Sun would cause the Sun to become a “flaming”, “self-active” ball. 
And here it comes the most intriguing part of the story, about the nature of these lighter 
particles. Because they were regarded as active principles of fire, and “no fire burns without 
air”,54 Kant concluded that there must have been air trapped inside the Sun; indeed, there must have 
been “elastic air” capable of “maintaining the most violent degrees of fire”. And while the Sun’s fire 
consumed and burnt “the elasticity of the atmosphere of the Sun”, at the same time—to explain the 
self-activity of the Sun—Kant latched onto the experiments of Stephen Hales to claim that “fire also 
generates air by the decomposition of certain kinds of matter (…), we may suppose that in the bowels 
of the Sun there are many substances which, like saltpetre, are inexhaustible in yielding elastic air, and 
thus the fire of the Sun may be able to go on through very long periods without suffering in any 
considerable way from want of the accession of always renewed air”.55 Hence, the self-activity of the 
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Sun was based on Kant’s surreptitious identification of the lighter particles of the primordial matter 
(which would abound in the Sun) with the elastic air, generated by the decomposition of saltpetre and 
alimenting, in turn, solar heat. 
In the following Section 3, I clarify some of the scientific sources behind this remarkable 
passage of Universal Natural History. I am going to show the following three main points: 
(1) the surreptitious identification of lighter primordial particles with elastic air betrays Kant’s debt 
to Newton’s Opticks (§ 3.1); 
(2) the emission of elastic air by decomposition of mineral substances (such as saltpetre) can be 
explicitly traced back to Stephen Hales’ chymio-statical experiments in Vegetable 
Staticks (§ 3.2); 
(3) the further link between elastic air and the matter of fire betrays in turn Kant’s debt to Herman 
Boerhaave’s theory of fire, as I show in § 3.3 3.3 and 4, when I finally discuss Kant’s essay On 
Fire. 
Once we have clarified some of the salient themes of the speculative Newtonian experimentalism that 
goes from the Opticks to Boerhaave via Hales, we will be in a better position to appreciate Kant’s 
dynamical theory of matter in 1755, in particular On Fire with its idiosyncratic blend of the three 
aforementioned main sources. 
3. Kant’s debt to Newton’s Opticks, Hales’ Vegetable Staticks, and Boerhaave’s Elementa 
chemiae 
In this section, I survey Newton’s pre-Principia work on air and ether, further developed in 
the Opticks (§ 3.1), Hales’ Vegetable Staticks (§ 3.2), and Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae (§ 3.3), in 
order to back up my previous claim that Kant’s unorthodox use of repulsion in Universal Natural 
History, and in particular his claim that repulsive force was not demonstrated by the science of 
Newton, betray his debt to the speculative experimentalism of the Opticks. In this way, the following 
discussion paves the way to the final part of this paper (§ 4), where we encounter again some of the 
themes of speculative experimentalism exemplarily synthesized in Kant’s On Fire (1755b). 
Newton’s philosophy of natural science has been the subject of important studies that in various 
ways have illuminated its complex and multifaceted nature. Despite the “hypotheses non fingo” 
of Principia, Isaac Bernard Cohen56 re-evaluated the importance of the hypothesis of the ether, within 
the methodological framework of speculative experimentalism typical of the Queries of Opticks. 
Through a careful historical analysis of the sources available at the time (especially scientific 
lexicons), Cohen concluded that the Opticks (much more than the Principia) influenced generations of 
British and Continental natural philosophers throughout the eighteenth century. One of the distinctive 
features of the Opticks, especially evident in the Queries, is Newton’s speculation about the ether as 
the medium for a variety of optical, thermal and other phenomena. 
Newton was not new to the hypothesis of the ether. In his early years, before the Principia, he 
had already speculated about an ethereal medium responsible for the cohesion of bodies, their 
elasticity, and gravitation, among others. This is evident in the famous letter to Boyle on 28 February 
1678/9,57 which was first published in Thomas Birch’s (1744) edition of Boyle’s works. By the mid-
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eighteenth century, mainly thanks to the enormous influence of the Opticks in the meantime, 
Newton’s speculations on the ether were no longer regarded as mere speculations: they became part 
and parcel of Newtonian natural philosophy. 
Some of the themes of the letter to Boyle appeared also in another pre-Principia text, De aere 
and aethere, first published as part of Newton’s Unpublished Scientific Papers by Hall and 
Hall,58 who dated it around 1674, whereas Westfall59 dated it after the letter to Boyle and in strict 
conjunction with it, because of the theme of repulsion at work in the rarefaction of air and the 
cohesion of solids. In the next Section 3.1, I take a look at these two pre-Principia texts to support the 
Halls’ conclusion that “The Quaeries [of the Opticks] show (…) that Newton’s theory of matter had 
made no progress since 1687, or even earlier, for its roots are visible in the chapter De aere written 
before 1675”.60 In particular, I concentrate on Newton’s analysis of air and ether as repository of 
repulsive force, as presented also later in the Opticks. As the Halls noted, there was a persistent 
ambiguity in Newton’s theory of matter between two quite distinct views: the first, clearly inspired by 
the dynamical corpuscularism of Boyle, took corpuscles as the repository of attractive and repulsive 
forces; the second resorted to the hypothesis of an ether as the ultimate repository of forces acting on 
corpuscles and engendering a variety of phenomena. 
In a monograph on British natural philosophy in the eighteenth-century, Robert Schofield called 
these two views ‘mechanism’ and ‘materialism’.61 According to mechanism, the causes of all 
phenomena have to be found in particles with their attractive and repulsive forces. According to 
materialism, the causes of all phenomena have to be found in a unique substance, the ether, as the 
medium of heat, electricity, vital spirit, etc. Both traditions originate from Newton’s Opticks, in 
particular the Latin edition of 1706 and the second English edition of 1717, with two new sets of 
Queries (Qu. 17–24 in the second English edition, and what was later numbered as Qu. 25–31, 
originally added to the first Latin edition). In the next three sub-sections: 
(1) I briefly discuss the origins of these two distinct traditions from Newton’s theory of matter, 
with a particular focus on the somehow equivalent and interchangeable role that Newton 
ascribed to the air and the ether as repository of repulsive force (Section 3.1); 
(2) I highlight some aspects of Newton’s theory of matter that had a direct influence on Stephen 
Hales’ chymio-statical experiments, and argue that Hales’ work (with some caveats) had a firm 
foot in the mechanical tradition that ascribed properties such as repulsion directly to particles of 
matter (more precisely, particles of air—see Section 3.2) 
(3) I then present the influence that Hales’ chymio-statical experiments, in turn, exercised on 
Herman Boerhaave, and how Boerhaave combined the mechanical tradition with the 
materialistic one in his theory of fire (Section 3.3). 
The continuity of themes that runs from Newton’s theory of matter—as exposed in pre-
Principia and Opticks—to Hales, and Boerhaave, will not only throw light on some of the points 
already flagged about Kant’s cosmogony, but also on Kant’s On Fire (1755b), to which Section 4 is 
dedicated. 
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3.1. The Newton before the Principia on air and ether: its debt to Robert Boyle’s experiments, and its 
continuity with Query 31 of Opticks 
As mentioned above, Newtonian scholars have long recognised the continuity in Newton’s 
theory of matter between some of the themes of his early pre-Principia works and his later mature 
work in the Opticks. In this Section 3.1, I want to highlight the continuity between the treatment of 
repulsive force (or better, its ancestor) in two texts of 1674–8 (De Aere et Aethere and Letter to Boyle, 
28 Feb. 1678–9) and some salient points of the Query 31 of the Opticks. Query 31 played a very 
influential role in the natural philosophy of the first half of eighteenth-century, and on the young Kant 
too, as we shall see in Section 4. So, it is all the more relevant to identify some themes of Newton’s 
theory of matter that run all the way from the aforementioned pre-Principia texts to the Opticks, in 
order to fully appreciate their relevance to Kant’s dynamical theory of matter. 
Among Newton’s pre-Principia texts, De Aere et Aethere was probably written—according to 
the Halls—between 1673 (when Boyle wrote New experiments to make fire and flame stable and 
ponderable, to which Newton seemed to refer in the text), and 1675, when he wrote Hypothesis on 
light. Since some of the examples discussed in this text (capillary attraction, cohesion, walking of flies 
on water) appear also in the letter to Boyle (28 Feb. 1678–9), by contrast with the Halls, Westfall 
dated De Aere et Aethere at the same time as the letter to Boyle. Yet, the Halls have a point when they 
noted some important differences between the two texts; namely, in De Aere et Aethere Newton 
identified in the repulsive force of air particles the cause of all these effects, while in the letter to 
Boyle repulsive air did not appear at all, and instead the ether is said to be responsible for the 
phenomena described. Hence, the Halls’ conclusion: “Newton has transferred the repulsive force from 
the particles of air to the particles of aether in certain cases, as he was later to do in all cases”.62 
I take this observation of the Halls as the springboard for my interpretive line about the legacy 
of speculative Newtonianism for Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755. It is my contention 
that the ambiguity in Newton’s language between dynamical corpuscularism as the cause of 
phenomena versus a material ether as the repository of forces acting on passive corpuscles not only 
engendered the mechanical tradition of Hales’ experiments on airs, and the material theory of fire in 
Boerhaave. But via Hales and Boerhaave, Newton’s ambiguity engendered also Kant’s early theory of 
matter in 1755, where soon some of the properties (i.e., repulsion) of the ‘fine matter’ diffused in 
cosmic space (as per Universal Natural History) became properties of an ethereal medium acting on 
the particles of matter and behaving as the matter of light and fire in On Fire. The upshot of the 
following discussion is then to highlight how Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter is the hybrid 
result of both the mechanical and the materialistic tradition, to use Schofield’s terminology, both 
originating from Newton’s theory of matter. 
This does not amount to saying that Newton’s mechanics did not treat the problem of repulsion. 
On the contrary, in Book II, Proposition XXIII, Theorem XVIII of the Principia Newton, for example, 
proved that an elastic fluid consisted of particles whose centrifugal forces were inversely proportional 
to the distances of their centers.63 But he also added: “whether elastic fluids do really consist of 
particles so repelling each other, is a physical question. We have here demonstrated mathematically 
the property of fluids consisting of particles of this kind, hence philosophers may take occasion to 
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discuss that question”.64 Newton’s mechanics left open this “physical question”, which fell instead 
under the remit of his theory of matter. 
Indeed already in De Aere et Aethere, Newton had explained why two lenses tend to repel each 
other, why melted lead does not adhere to an iron vessel, or metallic filings float on liquids, by 
assuming that “the cause of this repulsion” is to be found in a “certain surrounding sphere of most 
fluid and tenuous matter which admits other bodies into it with difficulty … [and] as it is equally true 
that air avoids bodies and bodies repel each other mutually, I seem to gather rightly from this that air 
is composed of the particles of bodies torn away from contact, and repelling each other with a certain 
force”.65 Not only was air identified with the “cause of repulsion”, but Newton went further to 
distinguish three different types of airs, depending on the way they were generated: 
i. vapours “arising from liquids seem to be the least permanent and the lightest” 
ii. exhalations “which arise from thicker and more fixed substances, especially in the vegetable 
kingdom” 
iii. and “air properly so called whose permanence and gravity are indications that it is nothing 
else than a collection of metallic particles which subterranean corrosions daily disperse from 
each other”.66 
Thus, “air properly so called”, or what was also known at the time as “true permanent air”, was 
regarded as having metallic origin, and not to be confused with vapours originating from liquids by 
heat, or exhalations originating from animal and vegetable substances. As examples of true permanent 
air being released by metals, Newton mentioned filings of lead, brass or iron dissolving in Aqua fortis; 
nitre ignited by charcoal, and releasing “aerial substance”; and nitre, charcoal and sulphur “as it is 
used in making gunpowder” whereby “almost all the substance of the mixt is changed by vehement 
agitation into an aerial form, the huge force of this powder arising from its sudden expansion, as is the 
nature of air”.67 This passage is remarkable because it anticipates some key themes that will prove 
important for the rest of our analysis, namely: 
a. the idea of air being the cause of repulsion and being lodged in the pores of mineral, vegetable, 
and liquid substances; 
b. true permanent air being of metallic origin and being released by fire and/or by chemical 
reactions with acids, such as iron being dissolved by Aqua fortis, also called at the time “spirit of 
nitre”— i.e. solution of nitric acid obtained by distilling at high temperatures vitriol (i.e., sulphuric 
acid), saltpetre (i.e., potassium nitrate), and sand; 
c. gunpowder’s explosions due to the expansive power of air trapped into the pores of the mineral 
ingredients. 
Newton was not alone at the time to advance such speculations about the metallic origins of air. 
Robert Boyle’s experiments had already distinguished between “true permanent air” and less lasting 
“vapours”, where again gunpowder and saltpetre (potassium nitrate) were regarded as capable of 
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releasing great quantities of air.68 The idea of air being the repository of repulsive force was part and 
parcel of the dynamical corpuscularism of the time. Yet, Newton soon introduced a new dimension to 
this mechanical tradition: the ether. 
Already in the very short remaining fragment of chapter 2 of De Aere et Aethere, Newton 
mentioned how the air particles could in turn be “broken into lesser ones by some violent action and 
converted into yet more subtle air which, if it is subtle enough to penetrate the pores of glass, crystal 
and other terrestrial bodies, we may call the spirit of air, or aether”. As evidence for the existence of 
the ether, Newton referred to the experiments of Boyle on calcination, whereby “metals, fused in a 
hermetically sealed glass for such a time that part is converted into calx, become heavier”.69 
In New Experiments to make fire and flame stable and ponderable (1673), Robert Boyle had 
advanced two rather startling claims for our story. First, he had assumed that cosmic space was filled 
with a fluid mixture of air and ether and that celestial bodies would be floating in it “like bodies in 
whirlpools are carried about by their ambient”.70 Second, to prove the existence of this diaphanous 
cosmic matter, and hence to prove that light was somehow corporeal, he described a long series of 
experiments on calcination of metals, whereby he concluded that the reason why metals got heavier 
(when burnt under a sealed container) was twofold: in some cases, the “adventitious moisture of the 
air”71 would attach to the body and increase its weight; but in many other cases, it would be the 
“flame, or igneous fluid” which would be “corporified with metals and minerals exposed naked to its 
action”.72 As we shall see by the end of Section 3, both claims proved important not only for Newton’s 
later analysis of the ether, but also for the Newtonian tradition that with Stephen Hales speculated 
about “elastick air” being fixed into the pores of bodies, and with Herman Boerhaave identified fire as 
a material substance incorporated in bodies. This interpretive line will in turn illuminate why in 1755 
Kant eventually identified the ether as both the matter of light and the matter of fire, in the Latin 
essay On Fire (Section 4). 
It is no surprise then that in the letter to Boyle, 28 February 1678–9, Newton went back to the 
issue of an “aethereal substance” diffused everywhere and “capable of contraction and dilation, 
strongly elastic, and, in a word, much like air in all respects, but far more subtile”.73 The step between 
air and ether was very short, given Boyle’s characterization of the interstellar space as a diaphanous 
                                                      
68 For example, in New Experiments touching the relation betwixt flame and air (1672) Boyle mentioned a 
mixture of gunpowder, charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre, whereby the ‘‘air . . .may be intercepted between the 
little grain of powder, whereof the mixture consists, the saltpetre itself may be supposed to be of such a texture 
that in its very formation the corpuscles, that compose it, may intercept store of little aereal particles between the 
very minute solid ones, which those corpuscle are made up of’’, in Boyle (1744), vol. III, p.257. 
69 Newton (1674), in Hall & Hall (1962), p. 227. 
70 ‘‘First, I considered, that the interstellar part of the universe consisting of air and aether, or fluids analogous to 
one of them, is diaphanous; and that the aether is, as it were, a vast ocean, wherein the luminous bodies (…) 
swim by their own motion, or like bodies in whirlpools are carried about by the ambient’’ Boyle (1673) in Boyle 
(1744), vol. III, p. 340. Emphasis added. 
71 Ibid., p. 343. 
72 Ibid., p. 344. Further in the text, in Additional Experiments about arresting and weighing of igneous 
corpuscles, Boyle reversed to the language of corpuscularism and spoke of ‘‘igneous corpuscoles’’ instead of 
‘‘igneous fluid’’, although the ambiguity in the language remains (‘‘igneous effluvia’’). What matters for the 
rest of our story is that he anticipated the same ambiguity that we will find in Boerhaave’s material theory of 
fire, although as we shall see in Section 3.3, Boerhaave disagreed with Boyle’s claim that ‘‘igneous corpuscles, 
that fastened themselves to the remaining matter, might be numerous enough, not only to bring the accession of 
weight, that was found by the scales, but to make amends for all the fugitive particles, that had been expelled by 
the violence of the fire’’. Ibid., p. 349. 
73 In Boyle (1744), vol. I, p. 70. 
  
mixture of air and ether. And whereas in De Aere et Aethere Newton had identified the air as the cause 
of repulsion, in the letter to Boyle, he transferred to the ether this original property of the air. By 
assuming that the ether could come in different densities, and it was rarer inside the pores of bodies 
and denser in free space, Newton speculated that “two bodies approaching one another…so as to make 
the ether between them begin to rarefy, … recede from one another”.74 As the rarefaction of the ether 
was allegedly responsible for bodies’ “endeavour of receding”, it was also responsible for their 
opposite tendency to adhere to one another whenever the density of the surrounding ether increased 
and pushed the bodies towards each other. Newton envisaged a balance between internal and external 
ether to explain how matter’s endeavour to recede was counterbalanced by a tendency to adhere, 
beyond a certain threshold. 
Most interestingly, by building on the distinction between vapours, exhalations and air he had 
already drawn in De Aere et Aethere, Newton used them as evidence for the ‘endeavour to 
recede’.75 But this time it was the ether mechanism that supposedly acted among the corpuscles of 
bodies (be they liquid, vegetable, or mineral) to separate them and generate vapours, exhalations or 
air. Moreover, it was now the ether mechanism that also explained the metallic origin of “true 
permanent air”, as the one released when, for example, a metal was poured in a solution of Aqua 
fortis. Newton assumed that the heavier the metallic corpuscles, the rarer the ether within the metal, 
and hence the greater the difference between internal and external ether responsible for keeping the 
metallic corpuscles separated from one another in a more permanent form. Vice versa, the smaller the 
particles of vapour, the denser the ether within, the easier for the vapour particles to condense back 
into water. Hence Newton’s conclusion: 
If you consider then how by the continual fermentations made in the bowels of the earth 
there are aerial substances rarified out of all kinds of bodies, all which together make the 
atmosphere, and that of all these the metallic are the most permanent, you will not, 
perhaps, think it absurd, that the most permanent part of the atmosphere, which is the true 
air, should be constituted of these.76 
Newton used almost identical words decades later, when in Query 31 of the Opticks he spoke of “true 
permanent Air” arising by fermentation from those bodies “which the Chymists called fix’d”, whose 
“Particles receding from one another with the greatest Force, and being most difficultly brought 
together, which upon Contact cohere most strongly. And because the Particles of permanent air are 
grosser, and arise from denser substances than those of Vapours, thence it is that true Air is more 
ponderous than Vapour”.77 And as evidence for the repulsive force at work in true permanent air, 
Newton mentioned exactly the same examples he had mentioned thirty years earlier (in De Aere et 
Aethere) about why flies can walk on the water, or two lenses resist direct contact. 
Indeed, in Query 31 of Opticks, Newton famously advocated attractive and repulsive forces as 
two fundamental Qualities in nature, whose causes were however unknown. Evidence for them 
supposedly came from chemical reactions such as Salt of Tartar (potassium carbonate) attracting the 
                                                      
74 Ibid., p. 71. 
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76 Ibid., p. 73. 
77 Newton (1704/1717), Query 31, ed. (1952), p. 396. 
  
“water which float in the Air in the form of Vapour”, or, vice versa, Aqua fortis dissolving iron filings 
and liberating their particles into water “with a great Heat and Ebullition”. The ether mechanism of the 
letter to Boyle did not feature in Query 31 to explain the latter phenomenon. There is no mention of 
the ether at all in this Query, and Newton seemed to revert to the language of dynamical 
corpuscularism of De Aere et Aethere also in the choice of his examples (e.g., why Pulvis fulminans—
mixture of sulphur, nitre, and salt of tartar—gave a more powerful explosion than gunpowder; or why 
“sulphureous Steams abound in the Bowels of the Earth and ferment with minerals and sometimes 
take fire with a sudden Coruscation and Explosion”).78 Yet, there is no explicit mention of the air as 
the cause of repulsion either. Newton contented himself with noticing how “in Fermentations the 
Particles of Bodies (…) are put into new Motions by a very potent Principle and (…) vanish into Air, 
and Vapour, and Flame”.79 So, air and vapours were now evidence for a powerful Principle, as 
opposed to being the cause of or the repository of it. Newton identified two fundamental principles in 
nature: 
Seeing therefore the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing, 
there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active Principles, such as are the 
cause of Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their Motion in their Orbs, and 
Bodies acquire great Motion in falling; and the cause of Fermentation, by which the 
Hearth and Blood of Animals are kept in perpetual motion; (…) the Caverns of the Earth 
are blown up, and the Sun continues violently hot and lucid, and warms all things by his 
Light.80 
If attraction, or better the “cause of Gravity”, is one of the fundamental principles, what is the other 
principle, i.e. the “cause of Fermentation”, animal heat, natural explosions, and the Sun’s heat? It is at 
this point of Query 31 that in addition to attraction, Newton introduced repulsion (or what he called a 
“repulsive Power” or “virtue”), whose evidence for came from “the Production of Air and Vapour. 
The Particles (…) are shaken off from Bodies by Heat or Fermentation, so soon as they are beyond the 
reach of the Attraction of the Body, receding from it, and also from one another with great 
strength”.81 And he referred implicitly to Boyle’s discussion of “Particles of Air to be springy and 
ramous, or rolled up like Hoops” to conclude critically that none of these ingenious mechanical 
hypotheses could explain the vast contraction and expansion of aerial particles—’fixed’ or released 
from bodies—unless “a repulsive Power” was assumed.82 
But there is more. In Query 31, Newton introduced these two active principles of attraction and 
repulsion to explain how matter in the universe could be kept in motion and avoid decaying. He 
referred indirectly to the Cartesian vortex theory83 to argue that “if it were not for these Principles, the 
Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all things in them would grow cold and freeze, and 
become inactive Masses”.84 Hence, his conclusion that “God in the beginning formed Matter in solid, 
massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other 
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82 Ibid., p. 396. 
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Properties, and in such Proportion to Space, as most conducted to the End for which he form’d 
them”.85 
We can now better appreciate why in the Preface to Universal Natural History Kant said that 
repulsive force “is accepted here only in that understanding of it which no one questions, namely, in 
connection with the finest dissolution of matter, as for instance in vapour”.86 This was precisely the 
way Newton introduced repulsive force in Query 31 of Opticks, and also the way in which repulsive 
force entered in the vocabulary of British natural philosophy in the first half of the eighteenth century. 
But most importantly, we can also understand why Kant was not happy with Newton’s reliance on 
God in creating a universe, where particles’ sizes, properties, and proportions were ultimately the 
expression of God’s divine plan. Hence, Kant’s attempt to strike a middle ground between the 
mechanical (be it Cartesian or Leibnizian) tradition that resorted to a ‘material cause’ for explaining 
the origins of celestial bodies, and why they began to spin, and the similarly unsatisfactory Newtonian 
explanation in terms of ‘divine intervention’ (recall Section 2.1 above). 
The air and the ether as the cause of repulsion have both gone in Query 31, but the phenomena 
described to back up the repulsive power are the very same phenomena that decades earlier Newton 
had used to ascribe a repulsive force to the air first, and to the ether then. The ambiguity in Newton’s 
language between the dynamical corpuscularism of air and ethereal materialism engendered two 
important trends in speculative Newtonian experimentalism of the first half of the eighteenth century. 
On the one hand, Stephen Hales brought Newton’s dynamical corpuscularism to the next level by 
rediscovering the chemical role of air as the repository of repulsive force trapped among the 
corpuscles of bodies. On the other hand, the idea of an ethereal diaphanous cosmic matter (or an 
‘igneous fluid’, to echo Boyle’s expression) was hard to die, and found a new expression in 
Boerhaave’s material theory of fire. It is via these two parallel trends that Kant’s reception of 
speculative Newtonian experimentalism took place, and crystallized in his very idiosyncratic analysis 
of On Fire, as I clarify in the final Section 4. But before we turn to On Fire, let us take a quick look at 
these two trends, starting with Stephen Hales, who picked up on the theme of repulsive force at work 
in vapours and fermentations. 
3.2. Stephen Hales on ‘elastick’ repelling air 
Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks (1727) brought the Boyle–Newton dynamical corpuscularism 
to the next level, making full use of attractive and repulsive forces for the explanation of vegetable, 
animal, and mineral fermentation processes. Most importantly, Hales rediscovered the air as the cause 
or the physical seat of repulsion (along the lines foreshadowed by Newton in De Aere et Aethere) and 
ascribed to it an important chemical role that Newton had not envisaged. In this way, an important 
theme of Newton’s theory of matter pre-Principia found a new life and expression, and was bound to 
have a lasting impact on the natural philosophy of the eighteenth century. 
Stephen Hales was a central figure of the British natural philosophy of the time. His primary 
research interests were plant physiology and medicine (his other book, Haemostaticks, 1733, 
influenced a new generation of Oxford and Cambridge iatro-chemists including John Friend and 
James Keill). Vegetable Staticks had a great resonance also in the Continent,87 where it was soon 
translated in French by Buffon, and from the French into German in 1748 with a Preface by Christian 
Wolff. Kant had in his library a copy of this 1748 German edition (Warda 1922: 03012. Exemplar: 
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<4> IX B 1169 m.); and, no wonder references to Hales’ Vegetable Staticks feature prominently in all 
Kant’s works of 1754–5 (Universal Natural History, New Elucidation, On Fire as well as in the Aging 
Earth essay of 1754, AK 1: 208). Here I clarify what salient aspects of Hales’ work influenced the 
young Kant, and highlight both the continuity with the Boyle–Newton corpuscularism and the novel 
twist Hales gave to this tradition. As we shall see by the end of this Section 3, there is an important 
theme that runs from Newton’s theory of matter in the pre-Principia and Opticks, via 
Hales’ Vegetable Staticks, to Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae (1732), and that provides—if my 
analysis is correct—the background for Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755. 
In Chapter 6 of Vegetable Staticks, Hales latched onto Boyle’s experiments on the production of 
air from the fermentation of “Grapes, Plums, Gooseberries, Cherries, and Pease”.88 He used an 
experimental device consisting of a small retort connected to a glass vessel with a hole at the bottom 
and immersed in a large vessel of water. By placing the retort (containing different kinds of animal, 
vegetable or mineral substances) on a stove, Hales could observe the effects of combustion, with the 
“expansion of the Air and the matter which was distilling”. Hales could measure—through the 
changing level of water rushing through the hole—the quantity of air absorbed or released via the 
fermentation of various substances. The long series of experiments that occupy Chapter 6 was meant 
to demonstrate Newton’s claim in Query 31 of the Opticksthat “true permanent Air arises by 
fermentation or heat, from those bodies which the chymists called fixed, whose particles adhere by a 
strong attraction, and are not therefore separated and rarified without fermentation. Those particles 
receding from one another with the greatest repulsive force, and being most difficultly brought 
together, which upon contact were most strongly united”.89 As we saw in Section 3.1, this was indeed 
a central theme of Newton’s theory of matter already in the pre-Principia texts. Hales somehow 
revived the pre-Principia view of the air being the cause of repulsion, by making the air ‘elastick’. 
Hales theorised the ‘elasticity’ of the air—due to highly repelling air particles—normally 
‘fixed’ by strongly attracting sulphureous oily particles (which would allegedly abound in all bodies) 
and lodged among the pores of animal, vegetable, and mineral substances. I want to draw attention to 
some points of Hales’ experiments in Ch. 6 of Vegetable Staticks, which will hopefully clarify both 
the continuity with the Boyle–Newton dynamical corpuscularism, and the influence that Hales himself 
exercised on another central figure of the time, i.e. Herman Boerhaave. 
Like Newton and Boyle, who explained gunpowder explosions as due to aerial repelling 
particles trapped in the pores of mineral substances, Hales too resorted to the same example to back up 
the hypothesis of ‘elastick air’. By latching directly onto Boyle’s experiments on nitre,90 Hales noted 
that Aqua fortis poured on a solution of salt of tartar “did not shoot into fair crystal of salt-petre, till it 
had been long exposed to the open air; whence he [Boyle] suspected that the air contribution to that 
artificial production of salt-petre”.91 This is the reaction whereby the corrosive nitric acid (HNO3—
known at the time as Aqua fortis or ‘spirit of Nitre’) combines with potassium carbonate (K2CO3—
known as “salt of Tartar”) to produce potassium nitrate (KNO3—or saltpetre), a fundamental 
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component of gunpowder. Going beyond Boyle’s hesitant conclusion about the contribution of air to 
this chemical process, Hales offered an explanation of the “intense burning of Fire” and explosions in 
terms of quantity of elastic aerial particles present in various substances. Thus, ‘spirit of Nitre’ was 
supposed to have little elastic air in it, and if poured on coals, it died out; but when mixed with salt of 
Tartar, it reduced to nitre, and flamed (if thrown in the fire) because salt of Tartar abounded with 
elastic aerial particles. If this point illustrates well, I think, Hales’ debt to the Boyle–Newton 
dynamical corpuscularism, on the other hand, Hales owed also a debt to Newton’s materialistic 
tradition (originating from the hypothesis of ether). Or better the Newtonian ambiguity between the 
language of dynamical corpuscularism and the language of ethereal materialism appears in Hales too. 
Recall that for Newton the ether was much rarer than the air, and the ether mechanism was 
supposed to act among the inert corpuscles of bodies (be they vegetable, animal or mineral ones) to 
separate them and generate vapours, exhalations or air; moreover, it also explained the metallic origin 
of “true permanent air” released when metals were dissolved in acids. In Chapter 6 of Vegetable 
Staticks, we hardly find any reference to the ether.92 But there is one passage, which also Schofield 
notices, where Hales explicitly quoted both Query 18 and Query 21 of the Opticks, in assuming 
that sulphur and air were acted by ”that ethereal medium ‘by which (the great Sir Isaac Newton 
supposes) light is refracted and reflected, and by whose vibrations light communicates heat to bodies’. 
(…) And is not this medium exceedingly more rare and subtle than the air, and exceedingly more 
elastick and active? And does it not readily pervade all bodies,Opticks Qu. 18. The elastick force of 
this medium (…) must be above 490,000,000,000 times greater than the elastick force of the air is, in 
proportion to its density, ibid., qu. 21’”.93 
I do not think this reference to the ether is marginal. The repelling elastic air of Hales is in fact 
perfectly consonant with Newton’s ether as itself a material repository of repulsive force (recall that 
Newton transferred to the ether the repulsive force he had originally ascribed to the air), and as the 
medium of both light and heat, as per Query 18 of Opticks.94 Moreover, if we consider that by the time 
Kant picked up on Hales in 1755, Newton’s famous letter to Boyle (28 Feb. 1678/9) had been 
published by almost eleven years (in 1744 with Thomas Birch’s edition of the Works of Boyle), and 
that—as Schofield points out—the Birch edition helped reinstating the ether hypothesis, we can easily 
see that—from the point of view of the young Kant writing in 1755—there must have been a small 
step from Newton’s ether (medium of light and heat) to Hales’ ether (medium acting on both the 
‘elastick’ repelling air particles and the attracting sulphureous particles). The central interpretive 
hypothesis of this paper is that the young Kant, in his pre-Critical theory of matter of 1755, received 
the Boyle–Newton tradition, with its inherent ambiguity between the mechanical language and the 
materialistic one, via Stephen Hales. 
No wonder Kant mentioned Stephen Hales in Universal Natural History, where he speculated 
about the bowels of the Sun abounding of substances such as saltpetre that could release enough 
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elastic air to aliment the combustion inside the ‘flaming’ Sun.95 And references to Hales’ experiments 
on gunpowder feature also prominently in New Elucidation (1755c) to back up Kant’s principle of 
causality, or determining ground. Indeed, in Proposition X of New Elucidation, where Kant exposes 
some corollaries of the principle of determining ground such as “(1) There is nothing in that which is 
grounded which was not in the ground itself”, as an illustration of this corollary, Kant mentions once 
again Hales’ experiments on elastic air and fire: 
Very frequently we see enormous forces issue from an infinitely small initiating cause. 
How measureless is the explosive force produced when a spark is put to gunpowder? (…) 
In these cases (…) the efficient cause of the enormous forces is a cause that lies hidden 
within the structure of bodies. I refer namely to the elastic matter either of air, as in the 
case of gunpowder (according to the experiments of Hales), or of the igneous matter, as is 
the case with all inflammable bodies whatever. The efficient cause is, in these cases, 
unleashed, rather than actually produced, by the tiny stimulus. Elastic forces which are 
compressed together are stored within; and if these forces are stimulated just a little, they 
will release forces which are proportionate to the reciprocal pressure exercised in 
attraction and repulsion.96 
Thus, Kant’s very same criticism of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason in New Elucidation and its 
substitution with a new principle of determining ground can be regarded as informed by the young 
Kant’s scientific interests in speculative Newtonian experimentalism, no less than by his Pietist 
background.97 
To sum up and conclude this subsection, Kant’s idea of repulsive force at work in the 
production of airs and vapours is deeply rooted in the Boyle–Newton tradition, which eventually 
culminated in Newton’s Opticks, and in the ensuing tradition of speculative Newtonian 
experimentalism of Stephen Hales. 
We saw how ‘elastick air’, due to repulsive force and chemically ‘fixed’ in bodies, was 
supposed to be released via combustion and fermentation, and how both in Newton’s Queries and in 
some passages of Hales, the ethereal medium was considered not just as the medium of light and heat, 
but also as the medium for the action and reaction of elastic repelling air particles and sulphureous 
attracting particles. Indeed, via this alleged ether mechanism, Hales concluded that 
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new metaphysics of causality as grounded in nature’s dynamical forces, without the need of resorting either to 
the pre-established harmony, or to the mere existence of substances. His dynamical theory of matter, patterned 
upon Newton’s and Hales’ experimentalism, provided then the blueprint for his metaphysics of causality; or, so I 
would like to suggest here. 
  
what we call the fire particles in Lime, and several other bodies, which have undergone 
the fire, are the sulphureous and elastick particles of the fire fix’d in the Lime; which 
particles, while the Lime was hot, were in a very active, attracting and repelling state; and 
being, as the Lime cooled, detained in the solid body of the Lime, (…) they must 
necessarily continue in that fix’d state, notwithstanding the ethereal medium, which is 
supposed freely to pervade all bodies, be continually soliciting them to action. But when 
the solid substance of Lime is dissolved, by the affusion of some liquid, (…) a violent 
ebullition ensues, from the action and reaction of these particles, till one part of the 
elastick particles are subdued and fix’d by the strong attraction of the sulphur, and the 
other part is got beyond the sphere of its attraction, and thereby thrown off into true 
permanent air.98 
As Boyle had introduced the hypothesis of an ethereal cosmic matter in the context of his speculations 
about why metals got heavier during calcination processes, and concluded that the “flame, or igneous 
fluid” was “corporified with metals and minerals exposed naked to its action”;99 similarly, Hales 
concluded that despite the mediating action of the ethereal substratum, ‘fire particles’ (consisting 
themselves of a balance of sulphureous and elastick ones) would normally be fixed in mineral 
substances until the elastick air were released into true air by ebullition. The step between the elastick 
repelling particles of air at work in fermentations, and the elastick repelling particles of fire was very 
short. Hales first took that step, which subsequently Herman Boerhaave developed in a new direction. 
This remark is important because—as we shall see in Section 4—in On Fire, Kant defended the 
idea of an elastic ether as the matter of fire. My point is that the materiality of fire that we find in On 
Fire (but also in New Elucidation, where in the aforementioned passage Kant talked of “igneous 
matter” trapped in all inflammable bodies) is just the natural consequence of the Boyle–Newton 
tradition, via its re-elaboration through Hales’ chymio-statical experiments and Herman Boerhaave’s 
theory of fire, to which I now turn. 
Herman Boerhaave’s materialistic theory of fire, as opposed to the Boyle–Newton’s overall 
non-materialistic theory of fire,100 played a key role in the advent of materialism in Britain101 and in 
the Continent (in the Netherlands and in Germany, in particular). The Leiden faculty of medicine, 
which flourished at the very beginning of the seventeenth century with De Volder first, and Herman 
Boerhaave later, became a famous international centre, where generations of Continental and British 
physicians and chemists were educated. So we need to look briefly at this further important trend in 
speculative Newtonian experimentalism and its legacy for Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter. 
 
 
3.3. Herman Boerhaave on air and fire 
                                                      
98 Hales (1727). Edition used (1961), pp. 162–3. 
99 Boyle (1673) in Boyle (1744), vol. III, p. 344. 
100 There are some important caveats: as far as Newton is concerned, see Query 18 and 21, where heat is indeed 
related to a material vibrating ether; as far as Boyle is concerned, see my remarks about the linguistic ambiguity 
‘igneous fluid’ and ‘igneous particles’ in footnote 72 above. 
101 As Schofield (1970), p. 132, notes ‘‘physicians were, for the next half-century, to carry much of the burden 
in Britain of developing a materialistic experimental natural philosophy’’. 
  
Stephen Hales exercised a deep influence on Dutch natural philosophy, which flourished in 
Leiden in the first half of the seventeenth century thanks to a series of key figures, from Herman 
Boerhaave to William Jacob ‘sGravesande, and Pieter van Musschenbroek. ‘sGravesande’s 
textbook Physices elementa mathematica (1720–1) defended Newtonianism and had two English 
translations by Jean Theofile Desaguliers and John Keill. Pieter van Musschenbroek’s Elementa 
physicae (1734) became a central textbook in experimental philosophy and in 1741 was translated into 
English, while a German translation appeared in 1747 (Kant had a copy of the German translation—
Warda 1922:05022. Exemplar: <4> X C 163 d.). 
The importance of the Leiden school for spreading Newtonianism in the Continent has rightly 
received historians’ attention, and it is not my aim here to add anything original to the existing 
literature.102 Instead, my more modest aim is to illustrate some points of continuity with both 
the Opticks and Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that in my view are salient to appreciate the origins of 
Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter. Like Newton and Hales, both ‘sGravesande and 
Musschenbroek believed in repulsive force and explained the elasticity of the air accordingly 
(although there is no mention of the ether in either of these two authors). 
There is one theme that runs through the three figures of ‘sGravesande, Musschenbroek, and 
Boerhaave with a certain continuity, and that is important for the influence that Dutch Newtonianism 
exercised on Kant: the materiality of fire. Schofield sees in ‘sGravesande and Musschenbroek’s 
defence of the materiality of fire one of their most significant departures from Newtonian 
mechanics.103 ’sGravesande regarded fire as subtle, and contained in all bodies, 104 Musschenbroek, on 
his side, took fire as a fluid substance, adhering to bodies. He also identified the matter of light with 
the matter of fire, and thought that they were differing only in direction of motion.105 Both authors 
clearly picked up the theme of the materiality of fire from the most important figure of Dutch natural 
philosophy of the time, Herman Boerhaave. 
Boerhaave began his career by succeeding De Volder as Professor of Medicine and Botany in 
Leiden in 1709; he soon became Prof. of Chemistry in 1718, post which he retained until his death in 
1738. He was one of the greatest physicians of his time, and taught several iatro-mechanists and iatro-
chemists that from all over the Continent, England, and Scotland came to Leiden to study under him. 
His text Elementa chemiae (1732)—originating from a previous series of unauthorized students notes 
(Institutiones et experimenta chemiae, ca. 1724)—became a classic textbook for the chemistry of the 
time, underwent eighty editions and several translations in English. Boerhaave contributed to 
spreading Newton’s natural philosophy in the Continent, despite the fierce opposition of part of the 
French and German establishment. 
Some historians have argued that the publication of Elementa chemiae in 1732, just five years 
after Hales’ Vegetable Staticks, allowed Boerhaave to incorporated elements of Hales’ chymio-static 
experiments in his textbook. Milton Kerker, for example, has argued against Hélène Metzger’s (1930) 
study on Boerhaave that she omitted mention of the conspicuous discussion of Hales’ work in 
Boerhaave’s text, and how Boerhaave did support Hales’ views on the chemical role of air.106 Indeed, 
not only did Boerhaave build up on Newton’s speculations in the Opticks to defend the idea of an 
                                                      
102 See again Schofield (1970), chap. 7; Cohen (1956), chap. 7; Ruestow (1973), chap. 7; Metzger (1930). 
103 See Schofield (1970), p. 140ff. 
104 Ibid., p. 143. 
105 Ibid., p. 145. 
106 Kerker (1955), p. 40. 
  
ethereal medium penetrating all bodies and diffused in space.107 He also built up on Hales to defend 
the chemical role of air, in the first volume of his Elementa chemiae. What matters for our purpose 
here, is to clarify how Boerhaave gave a new twist to the Boyle–Newton–Hales dynamical 
corpuscularism by stressing the materialistic tradition instead, and how the end product of this re-
elaboration of Hales via Boerhaave influenced Kant’s On Fire. 
In the first volume of Elementa chemiae, Boerhaave discussed transitions of physical state, and 
in particular the boiling point of water. He referred to the experiments of Guillaume Amontons 
in Memoirs de l’ Académie Royale des Sciences demonstrating the correlation between the weight of 
atmospheric pressure and the boiling point of water: namely, that the “more closely the parts of water 
are compressed together by the increase of the incumbent weights, the more fire will be required to 
make them recede from one another; in which consists ebullition”.108 In this same context, Boerhaave 
mentioned also Fahrenheit’s discovery that the amount of heat required to boil water increased when 
the atmospheric pressure was considerable (e.g., at the seaside) and decreased when the pressure was 
lighter (e.g., on top of mountains). As we are going to see in the final Section 4, Kant’s reference to 
Amontons and Fahrenheit on precisely this point in On Fire, betrays explicitly his reliance on 
Boerhaave’s text. 
As a result of these observations on transitions of physical state and the boiling point of water, 
Boerhaave concluded that fire was an element109 that “it must always be present in every part of 
space … Nor does Fire thus exist only in every part of space, but it is likewise equally diffused 
through every Body, the most solid, as well as the rarest”, and its “most peculiar character” is “its 
property of rarefying Bodies”.110 Therefore, fire cannot be “created, or generated de novo, nor is there 
any destroyed when it is extinguished; (…) nor perhaps has it any weight”.111 In taking fire as an 
imponderable material fluid, Boerhaave was in a way continuing the tradition of Boyle’s New 
Experiments to make fire and flame stable and ponderable (1673) about an “igneous fluid”. However, 
whereas Boyle believed that the igneous fluid were “corporified with metals and minerals”112 in 
calcinations; Boerhaave expressly took the distance from Boyle in considering the fire imponderable. 
Instead, he ascribed the additional weight of metals in calcinations to a corrosive Sulphur, abounding 
in materials such as antimony, lead, tin, iron, and “rubbing of the particles of the other bodies, and 
thus mixing them with the matter to be calcinated”.113 These peculiar features of fire, as an elementary 
material fluid, diffused everywhere, present in all bodies and capable of rarefying them, echo the very 
similar features that Hales ascribed to air. As mentioned above, the step from the elastic repelling 
particles of air at work in Hales’ fermentations, to the elastic repelling fire at work in Boerhaave’s 
transitions of physical state was short, and can be summarized in the five main points here below: 
                                                      
107 To this purpose, Cohen (1956), p. 223, gives a quote from Shaw’s 1741 English translation of Boerhaave’s 
text where Boerhaave presents Newton’s hypothesis of a fine, subtle, elastic ether not just as a speculation but as 
a convincing demonstration, and adds ‘‘These notes reinforce the view that the Newtonian scientists of the 
eighteenth century were convinced that Newton’s positive views were to be read in the Queries of the Opticks’’. 
108 Boerhaave (1732), Eng. translation (1735), vol. 1, p. 104. 
109 Ibid., p. 104. 
110 Ibid., p. 113. 
111 Ibid., p. 211. 
112 Boyle (1673) in Boyle (1744), vol. III, p. 344. 
113 Boerhaave (1732), Eng. Translation (1735), vol. 1, p. 212. 
  
i. Like Hales, Boerhaave too associated air with repulsive force (“the Air resisting the 
motion with a remarkable repulsive force, immediately manifests itself to be a hard 
body”).114 
ii. Repulsive force was in turn identified with the “peculiar property of air”, namely its 
“elasticity, by which all known Air, possessing a certain space, and being confined 
there in such manner that it cannot escape, will, if it is pressed together by a determined 
weight, reduced itself into a less space … [and] by a spontaneous expansion, recover 
again the space it hath lost, in proportion, as the compressive force is diminished”.115 
iii. The elasticity of air was not an intrinsic property of a single particle of air, but instead a 
relational property requiring at least two particles.116 In this context Boerhaave referred 
to Boyle’s experiments to prove the elastic power of the air, and gave his own original 
twist to this theme inherited from Boyle and Hales.117 
iv. Boerhaave directly referred to Hales’ Vegetable Staticks, in particular his chapter six, in 
relation to the air being ‘fixed’ in bodies and released by fire in combustion 
processes.118 
v. Hence, the interchangeable role of air and fire was easily forged. Not only was fire 
responsible for releasing Hales’ elastic air fixed in solid bodies, but also vice versa: 
“Fire which puts all things in motion, can scarcely be either collected, preserved, 
directed, increased, or moderated, without Air”.119 
Stephen Hales’ elastic air, as the repository of repulsive force, finds then its counterpart in 
Boerhaave’s material fire. Like Hales’ air—which was an elastic matter chemically ‘fixed’ in the 
pores, and released upon combustion and fermentation—,similarly, Boerhaave’s fire was an elastic 
matter penetrating all bodies and rarefying them.120 
Metzger, in her classic 1930 study on Boerhaave, quotes Duhem in identifying Boerhaave’s 
material fire as the ancestor of Boscovich’s dynamical theory of matter, whereby matter is endowed 
                                                      
114 Ibid., p. 252. 
115 Ibid., p. 259. 
116 ‘‘This Elasticity then only has being, when two such Particles of Air come to touch and repel one 
another;…if these elastic aerial Particles were so far distant from each other. . .this repelling force should utterly 
cease. (…) One aerial Particle, therefore, would have nothing of this elastic power; but it would be only the joint 
effort of several’’, ibid., p. 264. 
117 Kant’s idea of repulsive force as an elastic force that manifests itself in vapours and spirituous substances is 
then borrowed both from the Boyle–Newton–Hales tradition and from Boerhaave, where the latter provided the 
background for Kant’s idea of repulsive force as a relational property of matter (i.e. it increases at short 
distances, and decreases at large distances). In Physical Monadology, Kant for example measured the strength of 
the repulsive force as proportional to the inverse ratio of the cubes of the distances from the centres of the 
physical monads (AK 1: 484.31–33). 
118 ‘‘By Fire, therefore, at least, elastic Air is always separated from those Bodies; and consequently such a 
matter was in them before, though whilst it was lock’d up there, it did not produce the effects of Air (. . .) But 
having seen, and to my advantage perused, a very elaborate treatise, published about two years ago by the 
famous Dr Steph. Hales, called Vegetable Statics, (. . .) I chose rather to refer you to that work’’, Boerhaave 
(1732), English trans. (1735), vol. I, p. 314. 
119 Ibid., p. 247. This last point provided the inspiration for Kant’s analysis of the self-activity of the Sun in 
Universal Natural History (as we saw in Section 2.2). 
120 Incidentally, Boerhaave’s view anticipated in this way Lavoisier’s imponderable fluid of caloric (no wonder 
Lavoisier paid tribute to Boerhaave in his treatise on chemistry). 
  
with attractive and repulsive forces, the former understood in terms of gravitation and the latter in 
terms of imponderable fluids such as caloric.121 This is also the interpretive line that I would like to 
suggest here below: behind Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755 (elaborated independently 
of Boscovich’s) lays the interpretation of repulsive force as a subtle elastic fluid surrounding particles 
of matter (among which attraction acts). The ‘sphere of activity’ of Kant’s physical monads122 is not 
that different from the sphere of activity of imponderable fluids, such as the electric fluid or the 
caloric fluid. And it derives from Boerhaave’s defence of the materiality of fire as a subtle, elastic, and 
weakly repulsive fluid at work in all transitions of physical state. 
It is with Boerhaave that fire was classified among the material elements: in the preceding 
corpuscular philosophy of Boyle (and even more so Descartes), fire was regarded as a consequence of 
the vibratory motions of particles.123 Newton himself held contradictory views on heat (sometimes 
described as a brisk motion of particles, and other times, notably in Query 18, as the vibratory motion 
of the ethereal medium of light, as mentioned above). Although Boerhaave fell short of identifying the 
matter of fire with the matter of light by contrast with s’Gravesande and Musschenbroek,124 his 
materialistic view of fire originates from Newton’s Queries.125 
It is in this historical and cultural context at the end of the 1740s and beginning of 1750s that 
the young Kant began to use Newton’s ether of the Queries as the medium of both light and fire, in a 
short Latin essay entitled De igne, to which I now finally turn, as it synthesizes all the themes of the 
Boyle–Newton–Hales–Boerhaave tradition I have explored so far. 
4. Succint Exposition of Some Meditations on Fire 
                                                      
121 Metzger (1930), p. 56. 
122 AK 1: 481.9–11. 
123 For Boyle’s terminological ambiguity between fire as a fluid substance vs. vibratory motion of corpuscles, 
see footnote 72 above. 
124 As Metzger (1930), p. 213, pointed out, Boerhaave did not identify fire and light because he thought that 
there were phenomena where fire was mostly present (as a hot poker) which nonetheless did not emit light, and 
vice versa optical phenomena such as moonlight where no fire could be found. A similar distinction between 
light and fire can also be found in other authors of this period. Johann Eberhard, for example, in Erste Gründe 
der Naturlehre (1753) distinguished between fire and light, since light is more subtle than fire (§ 318) and 
claimed that ‘‘elementary fire appears to be a fluid and highly subtle essence that is spread out through the entire 
universe and sinks in according to the laws of fluid bodies wherever it meets with the least resistance’’ (§ 311, p. 
314; I thank Eric Watkins for drawing my attention to Eberhard’s text, and for kindly providing me with a copy 
of this text). Kant used Eberhard’s text in his first semester as Privatdozent in 1756, so one may conjecture that 
he must have been familiar with this text by the time he was writing On Fire, and that it might have been this 
text to influence his view about fire as an elementary fluid. I have two obervations here in response. The first is 
methodological. Throughout this paper, especially in this long Section 3, I have never meant to engage in the 
rather daunting endeavour of exploring the channels through which Kant might have received Newtonian 
experimentalism (e.g., via possible teachers at the Albertina at the time, be it Johann Gottfried Teske, Karl 
Rappolt, or others). Other scholars have done work in this area, to which I can hardly add anything (see, just to 
mention two examples, Kuehn 2001, and Pozzo & Oberhausen 2002). My methodological strategy in this paper 
was to stick to Kant’s texts directly and to the sources quoted there explicitly, in order to reconstruct some of the 
themes of the Newtonian experimental tradition that in my view inspired his peculiar treatment of repulsive 
force as early as 1755. Coming to my second observation, even if one could arguably claim that Kant’s analysis 
in On Fire was influenced by Eberhard (Kant did not mention him in the text, whereas he did mention Newton’s 
Opticks, Hales, and Boerhaave), it would not challenge the interpretive analysis here offered because the case 
could be made for reconducing Eberhard’s theory of material fire back to the cultural milieu dominated by 
Boerhaave, as is also the case with ‘sGravesande and Musschenbroek. 
125 As for the debt to Newton’s Opticks, Boerhaave is explicit: ‘‘Is the cause of this the affinity there is betwixt 
Fire and Inflammable Oils? . . .you will see by and by, what a vast deal of pains I have taken to resolve these 
Queries: and I think it will be evident, that they ought all to be considered. . .See the incomparable Newton in his 
Opticks’’, Boerhaave (1732), Engl. translation (1735), vol. I, p. 105. 
  
In Section 3, I made the case for the following four main points: 
1. in some pre-Principia works and in the Opticks, Newton ascribed an equivalent role to the air first, 
and the ether then as repository of repulsive force; indeed, he transferred the repulsive force originally 
attributed to the particles of air to the ether. 
2. This shift in Newton’s natural philosophy engendered a persistent ambiguity between dynamical 
corpuscularism (as the mechanical view of corpuscles endowed with repulsive force) and a material 
ether as the ultimate repository of repulsive force acting on passive corpuscles. 
3. The two traditions of mechanism and materialism—both originating from Newton’s theory of 
matter—find their expression, respectively, in the mechanical tradition of Hales’ experiments on airs 
(with the caveats we saw in Section 3.2), and the material theory of fire by Boerhaave. 
4. The step from Hales’ elastick repelling particles of air at work in fermentations, to Boerhaave’s 
rarefying material fire at work in transitions of physical state was short. 
In this final Section 4, I am going to show how via Hales and Boerhaave, Newton’s ambiguity 
between dynamical corpuscularism and ethereal materialism directly influenced Kant’s early theory of 
matter in 1755, where soon some of the properties (i.e., repulsion) of the ‘fine matter’ diffused in 
space of Universal Natural History became properties of an ethereal medium acting on the particles of 
matter and behaving as the matter of light and fire in On Fire. Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter 
can then be regarded as the hybrid result of the mechanical and the materialistic traditions, both 
originating from Newton. 
Kant wrote the short Latin essay De igne in the spring 1755 as his Magisterarbeit. There is a lot 
of continuity between the mechanical approach of whirling particles championed in Universal Natural 
History and On Fire. In the latter, Kant spelled out the chemistry underlying the mechanism envisaged 
for his cosmogony, and clarified the nature of the primordial fine matter “widely diffused in the 
celestial space”. But precisely in the light of the aforementioned intertwining of mechanical and 
materialistic tradition, On Fire is dedicated to the ether as the medium of light and heat: most of the 
phenomena, which were discussed in terms of dynamical corpuscularism in Universal Natural 
History (from the elasticity of the atmosphere of the Sun to the formation of Saturn’s rings), in On 
Fire find their ultimate explanation in Kant’s analysis of changes of physical state and combustion in 
terms of a material ether. Hence, this short Latin essay occupies a central role in understanding the 
development of Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755, and beautifully exemplifies the 
idiosyncratic combination of the various sources we have explored so far. 
That Kant is taking the distance from the Newtonian dynamical corpuscularism of Universal 
Natural History, but also from the mechanical tradition of Descartes and the atomists, is evident at the 
outset of On Fire, where he argued that the fluidity of bodies could not be explained by the division of 
matter into smooth minute particles, but it required instead a “mediating elastic matter, by means of 
which they communicate the force (momentum) of their weight equally in all directions”.126 Elastic 
matter (materia elastica) had to be intermixed with corpuscles to explain the elasticity of solid bodies, 
i.e. why they resisted weights attached to them without easily breaking; or elastic properties of springs 
as per Hooke’s law. Section I of On Fire is dedicated to the nature of solid and fluid elastic bodies, 
with a series of demonstrations more geometrico of how any kosher mechanical philosophy à 
                                                      
126 AK 1: 372.06–11. Kant (1755b), English trans. (1986), p. 17. 
  
la Descartes could not explain the elasticity of solid bodies, even less so their rarefaction and changes 
of physical state, unless an elastic matter was assumed (as consonant with the materialistic tradition). 
Like Boerhaave, Kant too saw the force of fire as being manifested primarily in the expansion 
and rarefaction of bodies.127 And as Boerhaave defended the materiality of fire, similarly Kant 
identified the elastic matter lodged in the interstices of bodies with the matter of fire: 
Proposition VII. The matter of fire is nothing but the elastic matter (…) which holds 
together the elements of bodies with which it is intermixed; its undulatory or vibratory 
motion is that which is called heat.128 
And as evidence for the elastic matter of fire, Kant analysed the phenomenon of boiling as due to the 
elastic matter trapped in the liquid body, and acquiring enough force to overcome attraction, and be 
released in the form of elastic bubbles. 
From the identification of the elastic matter of bodies with the matter of fire, to the subsequent 
identification of the matter of fire with the ether itself, the step is short: “Proposition VIII. The matter 
of heat is nothing but the aether (the matter of light) compressed by a strong attractive (adhesive) force 
of bodies into interstices”.129 This is a remarkable proposition in which the ether/elastic matter is 
effectively identified both with a Boerhaavian matter of fire, whose vibratory undulations are 
heat, and with the Newtonian matter of light.130 
After Proposition VIII, to support the view of the ether as the matter of light and fire, Kant 
referred to Newton’s optical experiments, in particular to the fact that the attraction of oily sulphurous 
particles responsible for light refraction was also responsible for holding the matter of fire tightly 
trapped in the interstices of bodies: 
For oils (for instance, oil of turpentine) which according to the experiments of Newton 
and many others, reflect rays of light (i.e. attract them) much more than can be explained 
by their specific gravity, likewise have a boiling point far higher than can be explained by 
their specific gravity. Oils are the true fuels of flames, and in this state they scatter light in 
all directions. Thus is shown that the matter of heat and the matter of light agree as 
closely as possible, or rather, that they are not different.131 
As mentioned above, Newton believed that the different refractive powers depended on different 
proportions of sulphurous oily particles inside bodies. He also believed that sulphurous matter was 
important for combustion and linked “fat sulphurous unctuous bodies” to both refraction and 
combustion in Book II, Part III, Prop. X of Opticks. 
But Newton fell short of identifying the matter of light with the matter of heat. Although in 
Query 19, he resorted to the ether as an optical medium, whose different densities explained the 
refraction of light, and in Query 18 even took the ether as the medium whose vibrations transmitted 
                                                      
127 AK 1: 371.9–10, 376.5–6. 
128 AK 1: 376.18–21. Kant (1755b), Engl. trans. (1986), p. 23. 
129 AK 1: 377. 16–18. Ibid., p. 24. 
130 If we consider that more than forty years later, in the Opus postumum, Kant still identified the ether as the 
‘matter of heat’ or Wärmestoff, and thought that it was responsible for all changes of physical state as well as for 
light transmission, we can get an idea of the scientific origins of Kant’s peculiar view as rooted in his 
idiosyncratic combination of Boerhaave’s theory of fire, Hales’ view on elastic air, and Newton’s Opticks. 
131 AK 1: 377. 31–37. Kant (1755b), English trans. (1986), p. 24. 
  
heat, Newton never explicitly identified fire as the “matter of heat”, i.e. as a material substance. The 
materiality of fire betrays instead Kant’s debt to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae. 
So, effectively, Kant operated an idiosyncratic combination of Newton’s optical ether 
(responsible for light reflection, refraction, and thin films) with Boerhaave’s material fire, although 
neither Newton identified fire as a material substance nor did Boerhaave identify fire with light. But 
what evidence did Kant have for identifying the ether as both the matter of fire and the matter of light? 
Kant latched onto Euler’s Nova theoria lucis et colorum “according to which light is not the 
effluvium of shining bodies but is the propagated pressure of the aether which is dispersed 
everywhere”,132 and linked it with his own use of the ether as the matter of fire, via the example of the 
transparency of glass. Given the transparency of glass and its ability to refract light, since glass is 
obtained by fusing at high temperatures potash with sand, Kant concluded that the matter of fire—
which must be largely dispersed among the glass’ solid elements—must be one and the same with the 
ether, or the matter of light. 
And to measure the force of fire that manifests itself in the rarefaction of bodies, Kant referred 
to Guillaume Amontons’ report in the Mémories de l’Académie Royale des Sciences whereby the 
degree of heat was measured “by the elastic force of the air expanded by this heat; that is, by 
[measuring] the weight which is capable of being supported by the same volume [of air] possessed of 
this heat”.133 If this mention of Amontons already betrays—in my view—Kant’s reliance on 
Boerhaave’s text, even more explicitly later in the text Kant referred to Boerhaave’s Elementa 
chemiae to report Fahrenheit’s experiments about the changing boiling points of liquids (depending on 
the atmospheric pressure), followed by a reference to Pierre Charles le Monnier’s experiments using a 
Reaumur thermometer to measure different boiling points of water in Bordeaux and Pic du Midi, and 
similar experiments by Jean-Baptiste Baron de Secondat.134 
It is here that Kant’s debt to Boerhaave becomes manifest in the specific way in which Kant 
devised an explanation for the change of water from liquid to vapour. As Boerhaave used the 
experiments of Amontons and Fahrenheit to claim that atmospheric pressure compressed the force of 
fire and prevented the flame from dissipating through some sort of action and reaction; similarly, Kant 
claimed that it was via the action and reaction between the weight of the atmospheric pressure and the 
“undulatory motion of the particles of fire” that the elastic ethereal matter was stably lodged in the 
pores of bodies. As soon as either the attraction among the corpuscles decreased or the weight of the 
atmospheric pressure diminished (as it happens on mountains), the “aether by its elastic force at the 
boiling point succeeds in its striving to escape from its connection with the water”.135 Note here how 
Kant’s language ambiguity between the “particles of fire” (particularum ignearum) and the ether 
(äther) echoes once more the ambiguity we have already found in Boyle, Newton, and Hales on this 
point, and it exemplifies Kant’s borrowing elements from both the mechanical and the materialistic 
tradition. 
In this same context, Kant mentioned once again Hales: “all plants, the spirit of wine, animal 
stone, and many kinds of salts, especially nitre, [that] release an immense amount of elastic air when 
strongly affected by fire, as Hales in his Vegetable Staticks instructs us with wonderful 
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experiments”.136 Kant referred once more to chapter 6 of Hales’ 1727 work to conclude that “Air is an 
elastic fluid, almost a thousand times lighter than water”, and that “It is self-evident that air extracted 
from these bodies by the force of fire did not have the nature of air (i.e. was not an elastic fluid 
possessing elasticity proportional to its density) as long as it was a part of their mass. Thus the matter 
expelled from the interstices of the body (…) shows elasticity only when liberated”.137 
Moreover, Kant referred also to Newton’s aforementioned distinction between exhalations and 
vapours (see Section 3.1 above) and explained their “wonderful elasticity” in terms of their particles 
strongly repelling each other.138 As Newton had distinguished between true permanent air, 
exhalations, and vapours, whereby the first was supposed to arise from the dissolution of metals in 
acids, similarly Kant advanced what he called “an opinion … worthy of their [physicists] most 
accurate investigation: whether air is anything but the most subtle exhalation of the acid disseminated 
through all nature which manifests elasticity at any degree of heat, however small”.139 So, like 
Newton, Kant too believed that true air ultimately originated from acid as “the most active and 
strongest principle by the attraction of which the aether is held together”; that is, the “true magnet of 
aetherial matter which holds all bodies together”.140 But where does all this discussion leave us? And 
what good is it to understand Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755? 
5. Concluding remarks 
Kant’s dynamical theory of matter can receive new light if we consider carefully the scientific 
background, against which Kant came to elaborate his view very early on in his academic career. It 
was not my goal to provide an analysis of his dynamical theory of matter from the pre-Critical 
writings of 1755, to the Critical period (Metaphysical Foundations) and Opus postumum. Instead, my 
more modest goal was to identify some key aspects of speculative Newtonian experimentalism behind 
Kant’s early dynamical theory of matter in 1755, especially his peculiar analysis of repulsive force, 
and to investigate how he came to elaborate his very own brand by extensively drawing on a popular 
tradition that goes from Boyle to Newton, from Hales to Boerhaave. What we have found is that Kant 
borrowed and adapted Newton’s optical ether and Hales’ elastic air and employed them in ways that 
neither Newton nor Hales envisaged. Kant’s idea of repulsion as an elastic expansive force is deeply 
rooted in Newton’s Opticks, and in the ensuing tradition of experimental Newtonianism that thrived 
both in England and in the Netherland. 
This important experimental tradition—which dealt with the matter of fire, wondered about the 
elasticity of air, and believed in an ethereal fluid as the repository of repulsive force (interchangeably 
with air)—is at quite a distance from the Newtonian mathematical physics that we are so accustomed 
to associate with Kant’s philosophy of natural science. It causes almost a sense of embarrassment in 
Kant’s commentators to the point that Lewis Beck, in the Introduction to the English translation of On 
Fire, felt the need to clarify that Kant’s dissertation is the end of a long tradition that was about to be 
overthrown by Priestley, Lavoisier, and Rumford. However, we should not forget the pivotal role that 
speculative Newtonian experimentalism played for the chemical revolution at the end of the 
eighteenth century. Stephen Hales and Herman Boerhaave paved the way to Joseph Priestley, Joseph 
Black, and Henry Cavendish’s pneumatic chemistry. The seeds of the chemical revolution can be 
found in the experimental Newtonianism that flourished in Leiden, Cambridge, and Oxford. 
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The leitmotiv that links repulsive force, air, ether, and a variety of chemical phenomena 
reveals—if my interpretive analysis here is correct—the real nature of Kant’s much celebrated 
conversion to Newton. The Newton Kant owed a debt to was not necessarily or exclusively the 
Newton of the first edition of Principia, i.e. the Newton that championed the new mathematical 
physics; but instead the much more controversial Newton of the Opticks, who ruminated on chemistry 
and on the possible ether-mechanism behind chemical phenomena. If we further consider that again in 
the Opus postumum Kant tried to prove a priori the existence of the ether in conjunction with his 
speculations on chemistry, we can envisage the far-reaching legacy of this leitmotiv in the evolution 
of Kant’s philosophy from the 1750s to the 1790s. 
Apropos of Newton’s ether, Westfall famously observed that “composed of particles repelling 
each other, the aether embodied the very problem of action at a distance which it pretended to 
explain”. In particular, Westfall argued that Newton’s ambiguity on the ether (against which he had 
abundantly written in Book II of first edition of Principia) can be explained by bearing in mind that 
there was another candidate in Newton’s natural philosophy for the semi-mechanical and semi-
dynamical role of the ether, namely God himself as an “incorporeal aether who could move bodies 
without offering resistance to them in turn”,141 which is perfectly germane to Newton’s idea of 
absolute space as the sensorium of God. 
If Westfall’s analysis is right, it would also explain why the young Kant in 1755, by rejecting 
the Newtonian absolute space as the sensorium of God, had to resurrect the idea of a material ether. 
Newton’s God as an ‘incorporeal aether’ was simply precluded to the young Kant. No wonder, he 
expressly took the distance from Newton’s theological stance in Universal Natural History, and 
repeatedly begged to differ from Newton on the role of divine intervention in the creation of heavenly 
bodies. If my interpretive analysis is correct, Kant’s stance on the ether in the 1755 writings would 
then not only illuminate the nature of his debt to Newton, but also their parting of the ways as far as 
theology is concerned. But this is another story that I leave for future investigation. 
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